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Language may serve to enlighten a hearer... but the light it sheds will be in
some degree clouded, if the heareris in his power.
Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetratethe other, but all in
their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used
.... What to an outsider will be no more than the vigorous presentation of a
conviction, to an employee may be the manifestation of a determination which
it is not safe to thwart.1

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE NEW PROMINENCE OF EMPLOYER
CHOICE IN THE CREATION OF
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

In the American system of labor relations, unions may only represent employees in collective bargaining if they prove they have the
support of a majority of the employees they seek to represent. The
representation election process created by the National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA" or the "Act")2 in 1935 is the statutory method of
making this showing for most private-sector employees. In the last
decade, "card check" organizing has become increasingly popular with
3
unions as an alternative to representation elections.
In contrast to political elections, which occur within the framework
of our existing democracy, union representation elections are the
starting point for industrial democracy. 4 Thus, the battle over elections and election alternatives in the labor-relations world is, at its
root, a battle over whether collective bargaining should even occur,
and the conditions under which its occurrence would be acceptable.
The rise of card-check organizing has given new grist to those who ask
whether and under what circumstances American employers should
1. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
3. See Michael M. Oswalt, The Grand Bargain:Revitalizing Labor Through NLRA
Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57 DuKE L.J. 691, 697 (2007) ("In fact,
card-check agreements have become the rule rather than the exception in organizing campaigns. In 2005, card-check was the genesis for more than 70 percent of newly unionized workers, compared to just 5 percent in the mid-1980s.").
4. Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and
Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 580-81 (1993) ("The union election
inaugurates-it is constitutive of-the system of labor representation. In contrast, the political election is embedded within an already institutionalized system of representative government . . . . The union election vests labor's
representative with no sovereignty in the workplace ....
[and] confers no unilateral authority on unions . . ").
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be made to collectively bargain with their workers. This Article will
discuss how Dana Corp.,5 the recent landmark decision on card check
from the National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB" or the "Board"),
illustrates a fundamental shift in the framing of American labor relations. The emphasis on safeguarding the rights of employees to collectively bargain over their conditions of employment has increasingly
given way to a new concern with safeguarding the ability of employers
to choose whether to engage in collective bargaining at all. Parallel
events occurring at the state level indicate that the considerations
that have driven this shift are not uniquely confined to decision-makers at the federal level. This Article will also analyze how the history
of the Act reveals this shift to be a rejection of the very basic understandings that drove the creation of the labor-relations system in this
country in the 20th century.
Card-check organizing, a relatively common method of organizing
workplaces until it was supplanted by Board-run elections in the
1940's,6 involves employees and union organizers gathering cards
signed by employees asking for a union. These card signatures are
"checked" against the employer's records, and recognition of the union
is granted or refused by the employer according to the verified wishes
of a majority of its employees. In its modern iteration, card check is
most often conducted pursuant to private agreements between a union
and an employer. The Board does not need to be involved at any point
in the process. 7 Authorization cards are still collected in a Board-run
election, but are usually checked only for the purpose of showing suffi8
cient employee support for an election.
5. (Dana I), 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007), 2007 WL 2891099.
6. The Act was amended in 1947 to make the election mechanism the only means by
which a collective bargaining representative would be certified by the Board.
Pub. L. No. 80-114, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-163 (2006)). See generally Becker, supra note 4, at 507-11 (discussing
Board's certification of unions as exclusive bargaining representative based on
non-electoral proof of support of majority of employees from 1935-39).
7. Private card-check agreements are enforceable because the language of the Act
after 1947 still contemplated that a collective bargaining representative could be
recognized (as opposed to certified) by methods other than an election, which
means that an employer could still be subject to liability under the Act for failing
to bargain with such a representative. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (referring to
"[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees .... ").
8. See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for ChangingParadigms,90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 824-25 (2005) ("If the union
has received card support from a majority of employees at the establishment, it
ordinarily will request that the employer recognize the union and enter into a
collective bargaining relationship ....
Employers, however, usually decline the
union's request and exercise their right to demand a representation election, in
which they will urge their employees to vote against unionization . . ").
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Many scholars have examined the merits of the criticisms and arguments in favor of card check. 9 This Article does not engage in such
an analysis. The arguments for and against card check are examined
where they reveal the framework within which the parties making
those arguments view the role of card check in American labor relations as a whole. Most of the arguments about card check are ostensibly made in furtherance of employee free choice, and so, taken
literally, none acknowledge that any other frameworks apply, or
should apply. For example, parties on all sides of the debate have
cited the Supreme Court's venerable card-authorization decision
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.lO in support of their arguments. But
missing from this debate is an explanation of how card check should
interact with the fundamental principle of labor relations that Gissel
Packing and other decisions of the Court from that era, such as NLRB
v. Exchange PartsCo.,11 embody-namely the principle of asymmetrical employer power in the workplace, and what that power means for
the creation of industrial democracy.
The Board implied that its decision in Dana Corp. took this principle into consideration when it proclaimed that the decision balanced
"two important but often competing interests under the [NLRA]: 'protecting employee freedom of choice on the one hand, and promoting
stability of bargaining relationships on the other."1 2 However, the
Board's focus in Dana Corp. on the adequacy of employer information
as to employee sentiments reveals a different, overarching interest:
that of "employer free choice" to recognize or not recognize a collective
bargaining representative, and whether such free choice is adequately
safeguarded in the card-check process.
The Board's preoccupation with this issue can be seen in the contradictory decisions Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. 13 and Wurtland Nursing & RehabilitationCenter,14 respectively issued a few months prior
to and on the same day as Dana Corp. The Board in these decisions
allowed an employer to withdraw recognition from a bargaining representative and refuse to bargain on the basis of employee-signed slips
and a petition. In each case, it allowed the employer to so withdraw
based upon proof of employee sentiment that fell far short of the authorization cards at issue in Dana Corp. 15 The timing of the issuance
9. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 8; Alexia M. Kulwiec, "On the Road Again" (To
Organizing): Dana Corp., Metaldyne Corp., and the Board'sAttack on Voluntary
Recognition Agreements, 21 LAB. LAW. 37 (2005).
10. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
11. 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
12. Dana 11, 2007 WL 2891099 at *1 (quoting MV Transp., 337 N.L.R.B. 770 (2002)).
13. 350 N.L.R.B. No. 55 (2007), 2007 WL 2322536.
14. 351 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (2007), 2007 WL 2963268.
15. One outraged columnist referred to the date of the Dana Corp. and Wurtland
Nursing & RehabilitationCenter decisions as "a date that will live in the Double
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of these decisions in relation to Dana Corp. makes clear that the position of the Board is that employers in this country should not be made
to participate in the system of collective bargaining where there is any
reason whatsoever for those employers to doubt whether a majority of
their employees actually wish for such bargaining to occur. 16 In this
way, the Board has come to openly doubt the first principles of American labor relations.17
In its many forms, the main argument made against card check is
that "union organizers will bully workers into signing pro-union
cards."1 Indeed, it was just such concerns about union coercion,
fraud, and misrepresentation that ultimately dominated the reasoning of the Board's Dana Corp. opinion. 19 The AFL-CIO protested that
such concerns are based "on inaccurate stereotypes from a bygone
era"20 of labor union power, and do not accurately reflect the greatlydiminished modern-day role of unions in our society and the real legal
restrictions on their access to unorganized employees.21 Yet it is precisely the diminished presence of labor in American society that has
allowed the criticisms of card check, whatever their degree of accuracy, to resonate with courts and public policy-makers, 22 and has lim-

16.

17.

18.

19.
20.
21.

22.

Standard Hall of Fame." Harold Meyerson, Editorial, The National Labor Ruination Board, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2007, at A17.
See, e.g., Henry H. Drummonds, The Union Authorization Card Majority Debate,
58 LAB. L.J. 217, 218 (2007) ("The 'card majority' debate reveals a major cleavage
about a fundamental issue in any system of labor relations: how unions should
'win' the right to speak for American workers.").
The former Chairman of the Board, Robert Battista, who was a member of the
Dana Corp., Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., and Wurtland Nursing & Rehabilitation
Center majorities, has expressed the view that it is appropriate for "different
Boards [to] act in different ways" over time, "so long as the Board does not stray
from fundamental principles and explains itself." Ronald Turner, IdeologicalVoting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707, 754
(2006). As argued infra, no such explanation for the shift represented in Dana
Corp. was ever given, which has implications for the legitimacy of the Board's
decision-making process. See, e.g., id. at 759-60 ("If ideology is the explanation
for the disregard of precedent, the suspicion that bias and partiality are affecting,
if not driving, decisional outcomes grows even stronger.").
Steven Greenhouse, Labor Seeks Boost from Pro-Union Measure, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2007, at A18, [hereinafter Greenhouse I],available at http://www.ny
times.com/2007/02/23/us/231abor.html.
See discussion infra Section III(A).
Brief on Review of International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agriculture Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, et al. as Amici Curiae at 25,
Dana 11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007), 2007 WL 2891099.
See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (holding non-employee
union organizers validly barred from distributing handbills in employer's parking
lot at shopping center); see also Randall J. White, Note, Union Representation
Election Reform: Equal Access and the Excelsior Rule, 67 IND. L.J. 129 (1991)
(discussing standards for union access in organizing campaigns).
But see Jonathan E. Booth, John W. Budd, & Kristen M. Munday, Is this Your
FirstTime? Analyzing U.S. Workers' FirstExperiences With Unionization20 (Oct.
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ited the argument over card check to the still-unanswered question of
whether or not to even engage in the system of collective-bargaining.
The American labor movement will never be able to move beyond the
Sisyphean task of arguing this point-rather than arguing the merits
of its record of representation to specific employees in specific workplaces-so long as the principle of asymmetrical employer power is
left out of the card-check debate. This Article seeks to refocus the
card-check debate on this fundamental principle, and its importance
in understanding how the arguments for and against card check
should be considered.
II.
A.

THE DEBATE OVER CARD-CHECK ORGANIZING

The Increasing Preference for Card Check Over
Elections

The American labor movement has made no secret of its serious
concerns with the ways in which the Board and the federal courts
have shaped the union representation election since passage of the Act
during the Great Depression:
If general political elections were run like NLRB elections, only the incumbent
office holder, and not the challenger . . . would be able to talk to voters, in
person, every single day. The challenger, meanwhile, would have to remain
outside the boundaries of the state or district involved and try to meet voters
by flagging them down as they drive past ....
[T]he incumbent, but not the
challenger, would have the sole authority and ability to electioneer among the
voters at their place of employment, during the entire time they are working.... [T]he incumbent could pull them off their jobs and make them attend
one-sided electioneering meetings whenever it wanted. The challenger could
never, ever make voters come to a meeting, anywhere or anyplace. And the
incumbent could fire voters who refused to attend mandatory meetings, or if
they tried to leave the meeting, or even if they objected to or questioned what
23
was being said.

Studies have confirmed the popular understanding of labor organizers that the level of employee support for unionization consistently declines between the end of an organizing campaign and the day
of a representation election. 24 One study found that, even where 70%
25, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
1025435 (This study of American workers with exposure to unions early in their
working life provided "evidence that the nature of a workers' first exposure to
unionization helps predict future unionization, but only modestly.").
23. StrengtheningAmerica's Middle Class Through Employee Free Choice Act: Hearing on H.R. 800 Before the Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 110th Cong. 3-4 (2007)
[hereinafter StrengtheningAmerica's Middle Class] (statement of Nancy Schiffer,
Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/020807NancySchiffertestimony.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Laura Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election
Outcome: An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme
Court's Gissel Decision, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 87, 115 (1984) (discussing a study of
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or more of employees signed authorization cards asking for a Boardrun representation election, the union won less than two-thirds of
those elections. 2 5 Labor ascribes this decline to employer anti-union
campaigning and unfair labor practices; employers offer the contrary
interpretation that more employees have simply been informed of the
pros and cons of unionization.
Out of an abiding dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, the perceived pro-employer bias of the Board, and frustration with the delays
inherent in the adversarial election process, 26 labor in the 1990's returned to card check as its preferred means of organizing, and has as 27a
result experienced modest success in organizing new workplaces.
Most card-check organizing campaigns to date have been conducted in
the private sector, as "voluntary recognition" campaigns pursuant to
private agreements between unions and employers, and do not require
the involvement of the Board at any point. 28 In the public sector, beginning in 2001, a number of states enacted card-check laws for their
employees, which for the most part brought this organizing procedure
under the regulatory auspices of the labor relations agencies of those
states.
The trend toward card-check recognition has not gone unnoticed,
and it has raised a different set of concerns among employers and advocates of management:
The goal of the organizer is to quickly establish a trust relationship with the
worker, move from talking about what their job entails to what they would
like to change about their job, agitate them by insisting that management
won't fix their workplace problems without a union and finally convincing the
worker to sign a card.

25.
26.

27.

28.

elections from 1978-80 in NLRB Region 18 that found that "unions, on the whole,
lost 13.3% of their support from the time of card signing to the election").
Id. at 118 tbl.9.
See, e.g., The National Labor Relations Board:Recent Decisions and Their Impact
on Workers' Rights: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor and Before the
Subcomm. on Employment and Workplace Safety of the S. Comm. on Health,Education, Labor and Pensions, 110th Cong. 4 (2007) [hereinafter NRLB: Recent Decisions] (statement of Jonathan P. Hiatt, General Counsel, AFL-CIO), available
at http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/121307JonathanHiattTestimony.pdf ("As a
direct result of this Board's failure to protect workers' participation in its representation process, unions have moved away from the NLRA's delay-ridden procedures, with its endless opportunities for employer coercion and interference, in
favor of voluntary recognition by employers.").
Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card
Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 51-52 (2001) (discussing a
survey of 100 card-check organizing campaigns that found 67.7% overall win rate
for unions, as opposed to 45.64% overall win rate in NLRB elections for the period
1983-98).
See Richard M. Reice & Christopher Berner, Unions Favor Card Check Recognition in Organizing but the NLRB May Rule, or Congress May Legislate, to Restrict
This Strategy, NAT'L L.J., January, 1, 2005 at 17.
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As an organizer working under a "card check" system versus an election system, I knew that "card check" gave me the ability to quickly agitate a set of
workers into signing cards. I did not have to prove the union's case, answer
more informed questions
from workers or be held accountable for the service
29
record of my union.

More recently, proponents of card check have attempted to move
beyond the passage of state legislation for public-sector employees,
and the use of private card-check and neutrality agreements for private-sector employees, and have sought to amend the Act itself to allow for this method of organizing.
B.

The Employee Free Choice Act

After the 2006 mid-term elections, legislation was introduced by
the new Congressional Democratic majorities seeking to enshrine card
check at the federal level. The proposed Employee Free Choice Act
(the "EFCA")30 would, among other things, amend section 9(c) of the
NLRA31 to allow for the certification of bargaining representatives
based on a majority showing of authorization cards, in lieu of a Boardrun secret-ballot election.32 The current version of the EFCA was introduced in both the House of Representatives and Senate on February 5, 2007.33 It was passed by the House by a 241-185 vote on March
1, 2007.34 The Senate first considered the bill on March 26, 2007,35
but ultimately rejected cloture on a motion to proceed to consideration
of the bill.36 Thus, the EFCA cannot be considered again by the Sen29. Strengthing America's Middle Class, supra note 23, at 2 (statement of Jennifer
Jason, former UNITE HERE organizer), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/020807JenniferJasontestimony.pdf.
30. H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2000).
32. H.R. 800 at § 2(a) (adding section 9(c)(6) to the Act, which states in part that, "[ilf
the Board finds that a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for bargaining has signed valid authorizations designating" a particular representative,
and no other representative is already certified or recognized, "the Board shall

33.

34.
35.

36.

not direct an election but shall certify the individual or labor organization as the
representative").
Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 800, S.1041. Previous unsuccessful attempts to
introduce the bill had occurred in 2003, H.R. 3619, 108th Cong. (2003), S.1925,
108th Cong. (2003), in 2005, H.R. 1696, 109th Cong. (2005), S.842, 109th Cong.
(2005), and in 2006, Right Time to Reinvest in America's Competitiveness and
Knowledge Act, S.2357, 109th Cong. (2006). Republicans in the House have also
attempted on several occasions to introduce an alternative bill to enshrine secretballot elections as the sole basis for recognition of a bargaining representative.
See Secret Ballot Protection Act, H.R. 4343, 108th Cong. (2004); 153 CONG. REC.
H2082 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2007) (motion to strike entire EFCA and replace it with
Secret Ballot Protection Act).
153 CONG. REC. H2091 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2007).
153 CONG. REC. S3729 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2007).
153 CONG. REC. $8378-S8398 (daily ed. June 26, 2007).

2008]

STACKING THE DECK

ate before 2009.37 Vice President Cheney had, in any case, indicated
that the bill would have been vetoed if it had come before the President. 38 Therefore, the EFCA could not have been enacted into law, at
minimum, until after the inauguration of a new president in January
2009.
The EFCA was hailed as among "the most important recent developments in the area of union organizing," and, if passed, as something
39
that could "revolutionize the labor movement in the United States."
One proponent of the EFCA offered a succinct description of the depth
of dissatisfaction of organized labor with the Board election process
that was motivating the legislation:
The secret ballot is appropriately considered sacred in a democracy, but it requires a democratic context to be meaningful. Today, NLRB-supervised elections often take place in highly coercive environments. As a result, they
approximate plebiscites in a dictatorship rather than a functioning democracy. The votes may be counted honestly, but
the outcome ratifies the inequi40
table atmosphere in which the vote occurs.

A former Chairman of the NLRB, on the other hand, warned that,
"it would be unwise public policy to abandon government-supervised
secret ballot elections in favor of mandatory card check," and noted
the Board and court preference for such elections to determine
41
representation.
Criticism in the media noted the danger of union misconduct and
the lack of opportunity for employers to present their case in the cardcheck process, with warnings from one House Republican that, "union
thugs had used physical force to have workers sign pro-union cards,"
and from unnamed opponents that "card checks ... are conducted so
quickly that companies do not have a chance to explain to workers
37. Steven Greenhouse, Clash Nears in the Senate on Legislation Helping Unions
Organize, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/06/20/washington/201abor.html ("But Randel K. Johnson, a vice president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, said: 'The cloture petition will
not succeed, and the bill will be pulled. That will be the end of that for two
years.'").
38. Francine Knowles, Bill Would Make it Easierfor Unions to Organize Workplace,
CHI. SuN-TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at 48.
39. William J. Bux & Miranda Tolar, Houston Janitorsand the Evolution of Union
Organizing, 70 TEX. B.J. 426, 428 (2007).
40. Strengthen America's Middle Class, supra note 23, at 2 (statement of Harley
Shaiken, Professor, University of California-Berkeley), available at http:l
edlabor.house.gov/testimony/020807HarleyShaikentestimony.pdf.
41. The Employee Free Choice Act: Restoring Economic Opportunity for Working
Families:Hearing on S. 1041 Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions, 110th Cong. 13 (2007) (statement of Peter J. Hurtgen, Morgan
Lewis & Bockius LLP) (citing Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969)), available at http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2007 03_27_a/2007_03 27_a.html.
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why they should not join unions."42 The Vice President for labor policy at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was quoted as saying that the
EFCA was "our No. 1 or No. 2 priority to defeat."43
III.

RECENT DISSATISFACTION AT THE FEDERAL AND
STATE LEVEL WITH CARD CHECK

The concern that unorganized employees may fall victim, against
their better wishes, to union "pressure"44 has animated a number of
different attempts to limit the extent to which unions in the public
and private sector may utilize card-check organizing. The most
widely-noticed action occurred on September 29, 2007, when the
Board issued its decision in Dana Corp. In that decision, the Board
reversed a forty-one-year old policy of according unions voluntarily
45
recognized by card-check similar protection from decertification to
6
that granted to unions newly-elected under the Act.4 The Board instead created a forty-five-day window period after recognition, during
which employees would be allowed to file a petition for a decertificaof
tion election against a newly-recognized union based on a4 showing
7
support for such an election of at least 30% of employees.
At the state level, opposition to card check came in response to
statutes which gave public employees in certain states the right to organize in this manner. California enacted card-check laws governing
many of its public employees in 2002 and 2004. In February 2006, the
judicial branch of the state's Public Employment Relations Board
("PERB") issued a decision in Antelope Valley Health Care District,4 8
in which a significant number of employee cards reading "No Union"
were disallowed from a count of card-check authorizations. In response to this decision,4 9 the rulemaking branch of the agency attempted in February 2007 to promulgate new regulations designed to
give employees a window period after a union requested recognition to
42. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Presses for Measure to Ease Unionizing, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2006, at A28 (quoting, respectively, Rep. Charlie Norwood (R-Ga.) and
unspecified "[o]pponents of card checks").
43. Greenhouse I, supra note 18, at A18.
44. See, e.g., George F. Will, Editorial, The Gift Of Doing Very Little, WASH. POST,
Dec. 23, 2007, at B07 ("Under [card check], once a majority of workers, pressured
one at a time by labor organizers, sign a card, the union is automatically certified
as the bargaining agent for all the workers.").
45. Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) ("No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any
subdivision within which in the preceding twelve month period, a valid election
shall have been held."); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954).
47. Dana11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007), 2007 WL 2891099 at *2.
48. PERB Decision No. 1816-M, 30 P.E.R.C. 60 (Feb. 10, 2006).
49. INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, PUB. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BD. (Feb. 16,
2007), available at http://www.perb.ca.gov/news/docs/14/Initial%20Statement
%20of%20Reasons.pdf.
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revoke their authorization cards. After a wave of comments protesting these proposed regulations, including from the state legislators who had authored the original card-check legislation, PERB
modified its proposed amendments in June 2007 to remove the revocation period. More recently, PERB's judicial branch issued an order in
State of California (Departmentof PersonnelAdministration),50 where
it sharply limited the precedential value of the Antelope Valley decision, thereby setting the stage for a future re-litigation of the revocation issue.
Illinois has had a card-check statute for most of its public employees since 2003. In August 2007, the Appellate Court of the state, in
County of DuPage v. Illinois Labor Relations Board,5 1 construed the
plain language of one of Illinois' card-check statutes to require a
higher level of proof of employee authorization than the state labor
relations board's regulations required, striking the regulations in
question. 52 The decision, which focused on the appropriate level of
proof necessary to obligate the employer to recognize majority support
for union representation, is on its face nothing more than an exercise
in statutory interpretation. Yet its reasoning echoes the ultimate concerns of both the Board in Dana Corp. and PERB in the promulgation
of its ill-fated revocation regulations. The events in these three very
different regulatory environments illustrate the extent to which the
foundational principles of labor relations have shifted in response to
such concerns.
A.

Dana Corp. and the Ephemeral Threat of Union Coercion

The Dana Corp. decision was long-awaited. The Board granted
consolidated review of the three separate administrative dismissals
that comprised the case on June 7, 2004.53 In each case, the petitioner
was an individual employee of either Dana Corporation or Metaldyne
Corporation. Each company had separately entered into card-check
and neutrality agreements with the United Auto Workers union (the
"UAW"). Pursuant to these agreements the companies remained neutral while the UAW gathered cards, and voluntarily recognized the
union as the collective bargaining representative upon the UAW's
54
presentation of a majority of employees' signed authorization cards.
Twenty-two days after Metaldyne recognized the UAW, and thirtyfour days after Dana Corp. did so, the petitioners, represented by the
50. PERB Order No. Ad-367-S (Nov. 6, 2007), available at http://www.perb.ca.gov/
decisionbank/pdfs/A367S.pdf.
51. 874 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), appeal allowed, County of DuPage v. Ill. Labor Relations Bd., State Panel (County of DuPage I/), 879 N.E.2d 930 (Ill. 2007).
52. County of DuPage, 874 N.E.2d at 330.
53. Dana Corp. (Dana 1), 341 N.L.R.B. 1283 (2004).
54. Dana 11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007), 2007 WL 2891099 at *1.
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National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, filed petitions for
an election to decertify the union. The elections were administratively
barred by their respective NLRB regions on the basis of the "recognition bar,"5 5 a Board policy that allows voluntarily-recognized unions
"a reasonable time to bargain" before a decertification election would
be permitted to proceed. 56 The recognition bar period is factually determined and unique to each case, 5 7 unlike the hard statutory oneelecyear "certification bar" granted to unions certified by a Board-run
9
tion.5 8 However, in practice, these periods can be similar.5
In a 3-2 decision in 2004, the Board granted review of (but did not
rule upon) the petitioners' challenges to the recognition bar doctrine.
The majority granting review stated that the increasing popularity of
voluntary recognition, "the varying contexts in which a recognition
agreement can be reached," the Board's preference for its election process, and the importance of employee rights under the Act "are all factors which warrant a critical look at the issues raised herein." 60 This
sweeping language led many in the labor movement to fear that an
absolute abolishment of the recognition bar was forthcoming, a fear
that at least some commentators dismissed as grandiose. 6 1 Nevertheless, this fear was visibly shared by the members of the Board who
dissented from the grant of review. They warned that abolishment of
the recognition bar "would make voluntary recognition meaningless,"
as employers would "have no incentive" to recognize or bargain with a
to
union with a card majority "if they know recognition may be subject
62
immediate second-guessing through a decertification petition."
As is often the case, no one was completely right but neither side
was completely wrong. At the end of a flurry of unfavorable decisions
in September 2007 that the AFL-CIO now refers to as the "September
Massacre,"6 3 the Board, while declining to overrule the recognition
55. Id.
56. Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966).
57. See, e.g., MGM Grand Hotel, 329 N.L.R.B. 464, 465, 467 (1999) (decertification
petitions respectively filed five months, ten months, and almost a year after recognition barred because reasonable period had not elapsed for bargaining from
scratch of novel contract covering thousands of workers in bargaining unit).
58. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 101 (1954) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3)).
59. See, e.g., MGM Grand Hotel, 329 N.L.R.B. at 465, 467.
60. Dana Corp. (Dana1), 341 N.L.R.B. 1283, 1283 (2004).
61. See, e.g., Charles I. Cohen, Joseph E. Santucci Jr., & Jonathan C. Fritts, Resisting Its Own Obsolescence: How the National Labor Relations Board is Questioning the Existing Law of Neutrality Agreements, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB.POL'y 521, 530 (2006) ("Perhaps because of this seemingly broad pronouncement, DanaIMetaldyne Corp. has been widely misconstrued as calling for a referendum on the legality or enforceability of neutrality and card check agreements
in general. The potential impact of this case is not nearly that great.").
62. Dana I, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1287 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting).
63. NRLB: Recent Decisions, supra note 26 (testimony of Jonathan P. Hiatt, General
Counsel, AFL-CIO).
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bar entirely, carved out an exception to it that may result in the bar
being rendered as meaningless as the dissenting Members of the
Board feared. Specifically, the Board ruled that "no election bar will
be imposed" until a notice has been posted informing employees of the
recognition of a bargaining representative, "and of their right, within
forty-five days of the notice, to file a decertification petition or to support the filing of a petition by a rival union," and the forty-five-day
period actually elapses without any such petition being filed.64 The
decertification petition would need to be supported by only 30% of employees in the bargaining unit, the traditional showing of support required for a Board election. 6 5 Although this was not the primary
relief sought by the petitioners, it was their maximum alternative request. 66 In contrast, the General Counsel of the NLRB, reasoning
that a longer period, "such as 30 or 60 days," could provide time for the
"active undermining of a union's valid majority support," and "essentially continu[e] the organizing campaign," asked the Board to create a
window period for decertification of no more than twenty-one days,
67
and to raise the proof of support threshold to fifty percent.
The Board explained its holding by stating that "both the Board
and courts have long recognized that the freedom of choice guaranteed
employees by Section 7 is better realized by a secret election than a
card check."68 The Board then listed four reasons why it believed that
secret ballot elections were superior to card check. Three of these reasons related to the potential for union-related misconduct in the process, namely: 1) "card signings are public actions, susceptible to group
pressure exerted at the moment of choice;" 2) "union card-solicitation
campaigns have been accompanied by misinformation or a lack of information about employees' representational options;" and 3) "[t]here
are no guarantees of comparable safeguards in the voluntary recognition process" to the Board's power to "invalidate elections affected by
improper electioneering tactics."69 The fourth reason was that unlike
a Board election, which "presents a clear picture of employee voter
preference at a single moment," the card-check process "take[s] place
over a protracted period of time," and "[d]uring such an extended pe64. Dana 1I, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007), 2007 WL 2891099 at *2.
65. Id. at *14. See also NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL § 11030.1 (2007).
66. See Dana1, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1287 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting) ("The
Petitioners' alternative argument-that a petition should be allowed within a 30or 45-day window after recognition-fares no better. Even if petitions are allowed only within the first weeks after recognition, the Employer's incentive for
voluntary recognition is nevertheless destroyed.").
67. Amicus Brief of the General Counsel at 14, Dana 11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007),
2007 WL 2891099.
68. Dana 11, 2007 WL 2891099 at *6.
69. Id. at *7-*8.
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riod, employees can and do change their minds about union
70
representation."
It is worth mentionimg that no formal allegations of improper conduct by union organizers or employee adherents were ever made in
either the Dana Corp. or Metaldyne situations. In private card check
and neutrality agreements, such as the two in this case, the Board has
no role in supervising or implementing the agreement. Nevertheless,
the petitioners or any other party could have sought relief for the improper use of coercion, misrepresentation, or fraud in the acquisition
of signed employee authorization cards by filing an Unfair Labor Practice (a "ULP") charge with the NLRB and alleging that such conduct
had occurred. 7 1 Petitioners admitted that they "[c]learly . . . could
have filed unfair labor practice charges, but chose not to ....
They
want a quick election, not a lengthy ULP prosecution."72 Nor was any
evidence of such conduct attested to in any of the declarations submitted in support of Petitioners' briefs, which made nearly identical boilerplate assertions. 73 This means that the issue of coercive or
fraudulent conduct in the acquisition of cards at Dana and Metaldyne
was never in the record before the Board.
The dissenting Members of the Board had pointed out in the original order granting review that the petitioners had recourse to, inter
alia, ULPs under Section 8(a)(2) of the Act, if they believed that their
74
employers had unlawfully recognized a union with minority support.
Subsequently, precisely such a charge was filed and dismissed in 2005
on procedural grounds. 75 Nevertheless, the Board, in 2007, credited
70. Id. at *8.
71. See, e.g., Dale's Super Valu, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 698, 698-99 (1970) ("The Board
normally refuses to receive evidence in representation cases that signatures on
cards were unlawfully obtained or were otherwise invalid or fraudulent. Such
issues may be litigated, however, upon appropriate charges and a complaint in an
unfair labor practice proceeding.") (footnotes omitted); see also NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL § 11021 (2007).
72. Petitioners' Joint Brief on the Merits, at 41, Dana11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007),
2007 WL 2891099.
73. The petitioners' declarations recited parallel allegations that for the most part
lacked any indication that such recitations were based on the personal knowledge
of the petitioners. See Petitioners' Joint Brief on the Merits, Declaration of Lori
Yost at 7, Dana 11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007), 2007 WL 2891099 ("UAW organizers did everything they could to make people sign cards. The UAW put constant pressure on some employees to sign cards by having union organizers
bother them at work, visit them repeatedly at their homes, and call them at
home. I believe that the UAW organizers also misled many employees as to the
purpose and finality of the cards. Overall, many employees signed the cards just
to get the UAW organizers off their back."); and Petitioners' Joint Brief on the
Merits, Declaration of Clarice K. Atherholt in Support of Her Decertification Petition at T15, Dana11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007), 2007 WL 2891099 (similar text).
74. Dana I, 341 N.L.R.B. 1283, 1286 (2004).
75. Dana Corp. (DanaIII), 2005 WL 857114 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Apr. 11, 2005).
At least one party on the other side of the issue saw an improper motive in the
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that such conduct could occur (and, impliedly, had occurred), and expressly mentioned the danger of this type of conduct as the basis for
providing a forty-five-day decertification window.
The majority decision in Dana Corp. provoked a strong dissent
from the same minority that had dissented from the original grant of
review. Noting that, "[uin any successful organizing campaign there
will likely be a minority of employees who opposed the union,"7 6 the
dissenters pointed to the majority's expressed dual goals of honoring
employee free choice and promoting stable bargaining relationships.
They argued that "the majority's decision subverts both interests: it
subjects the will of the majority to that of a 30 percent minority, and
destabilizes nascent bargaining relationships."77 In ignoring the established principles and policy judgments of the Board which were
embodied in the recognition bar, the dissenters lamented that "today's
decision will surely do nothing to dissuade those who are convinced
78
that the Act's representation process is broken-just the opposite."
The decision also prompted Democratic members of Congress to
hold a joint committee hearing on December 13, 2007, where Senators
and Congressmen grilled outgoing Board Chairman Robert Battista
on Dana Corp. and other controversial recent decisions. 79 Testifying
at the hearing, Board Member Liebman, one of the Dana Corp. dissenters, noted the stark contradiction between that decision and Wurtland Nursing & Rehabilitation Center8O issued on the same day:
In Dana ... employee-signed cards are treated as suspect when they are used
to establish union representation. But in Wurtland, the Board had no trouble
in relying on an employee signed petition to end union representation, without an election, even though employees seemed to be asking precisely for an
election. 8 1

Liebman remarked that this "contrast understandably raised questions about the Board's fairness,"8 2 and, in conjunction with another

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

82.

petitioners' failure to file such charges prior to litigating the validity of the recognition bar. See Reply Brief of Dana Corp. at 2, Dana 11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28
(2007), 2007 WL 2891099 ("Doubtless, they choose not to file unfair labor practice
charges for the simple reason that no unfair labor practices had occurred. The
dismissal of the charges would have totally undermined the entire premise of
their argument for abolition of the voluntary recognition bar rule.").
Dana 11, 2007 WL 2891099 at *20 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting in
part, but concurring in the result).
Id. at *16.
Id.
Sholnn Freeman, Labor Board Under Attack: Democratic Critics Allege AntiWorker Stance, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2007, at D01.
351 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (2007), 2007 WL 2963268.
NLRB: Recent Decisions, supra note 26, at 11 (statement of Wilma Liebman,
Member, NLRB) (emphasis omitted), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/121307WilmaLiebmanTestimony.pdf.
Id.
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aspect of the Dana Corp. holding, "at least suggests a double83
standard."
B. The Failure of California's Proposed Revocation
Regulations
A different debate was meanwhile unfolding in California, in a
very different regulatory environment. The state legislature first
passed a bill allowing card check recognition for public employees
under the jurisdiction of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (the
"MMBA"),84 which became effective January 1, 2002.85 Then, effective January 1, 2004, card check recognition was also codified in statute for the state's K-12 and secondary educational employees.8 6 None
of these bills attracted any significant opposition in the Democraticdominated state legislature, with only the University of California formally opposing the passage of the secondary-education card check
bill.87

Regulatory jurisdiction over the processing of elections and the litigation of Unfair Labor Practice charges ("ULPs") for these educational
employees was vested in the state Public Employment Relations
Board ("PERB").88 PERB had also recently been vested with jurisdiction over any ULPs filed by employees or employers under the
MMBA.89 This is the mechanism by which the issue of card check
ultimately came into its purview in the Antelope Valley Health Care
District90 case.
In 2003, Local 399 of the Service Employees International Union
(the "SEIU") was competing with another union to organize a large
83. Id. at 10.
84. 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5051 (West) (amending CAL. GOVT CODE § 3507.1 to add
subsection (c)).
85. See CAL. GOVT. CODE § 3507.1(c) (West Supp. 2008) (stating that a "public agency
shall grant exclusive or majority recognition to an employee organization based
on a signed petition, authorization cards, or union membership cards showing
that a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit desire the
representation," provided that another representative is not already recognized).
86. 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1588-89 (West) (amending, inter alia, CAL. GOVT CODE
§§ 3544.1 and 3544.7, which already provided for voluntary recognition); 2003
Cal. Legis. Serv. 1651-52 (West) (amending CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 3574, 3577).
87. 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1650 (West); see also Rachel Makabi, Card Check Bill
Could Affect UC, Union Dealings,DAILY BRUIN, May 15, 2002, available at http:/!
dailybruin.com/archives/id/19492/ ("Many Republican legislators, in addition to
the UC, are against the bill. According to Peter DeMarco, press secretary of the
Assembly Republican Caucus, card checks have historically not reflected the real
opinions of workers. Card checks make it easier for workers to be intimidated
into making a decision, he said.").
88. CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 3541.3, 3563 (West 1995).
89. 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5021-22 (West) (adding CAL. GOVT CODE § 3509, vesting
jurisdiction in PERB to process unfair labor practice charges).
90. PERB Decision No. 1816-M, 30 P.E.R.C. 60 (February 10, 2006).
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unit of non-professional employees of a public hospital in the high desert northeast of Los Angeles. The second union withdrew in December 2003, but SEIU continued to collect authorization cards. 9 1
Concurrently with these two organizing campaigns, a number of employees were soliciting and collecting cards from co-workers with the
words "No Union." 92 In January 2004, the employer sent an email to
its employees with instructions on how they could revoke authorization cards they had previously signed. By March 2004, when SEIU
formally requested recognition under the MMBA card-check statute,
9
only five employees had followed these revocation procedures. 3
The cards were tallied by a mediator from the State Mediation and
Conciliation Service (the "SMCS"). Out of a total of 1100 eligible employees, the SMCS mediator counted 569 SEIU authorizations, five
revocations, and 280 "No Union" cards. Of these "No Union" cards,
the mediator was able to match eighty-four of them with employees
who had signed SEIU authorization cards.94 In September 2004, the
employer's Board of Directors voted not to recognize SEIU, on the basis that the eighty-four "No Union" cards subtracted from the 569 au95
thorizations gave the union less than majority support.
The issue of ULPs filed by the union due to the employer's refusal
to recognize it and commence bargaining, went before an Administrative Law Judge, and ultimately a three-member panel of PERB. The
panel first expressed frustration that the SMCS mediator had not attempted to determine whether the eighty-four "No Union" cards were
valid revocations, thereby leaving PERB to resolve the ensuing unfair
practice charge. 96 It then held, as an issue of first impression, that
employees had "the right to revoke" their authorization cards, if such
a revocation "clearly demonstrate[d]" their desire not to be represented in collective bargaining.97 In reaching this standard, the panel
relied in part on longstanding NLRB precedent on the issue of revocations, which requires that employees "evidence [a] specific intent.., to
revoke previously signed authorization cards."98
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 10 ("[U]nder Section 3507.1(c), the neutral third party, in this case the
SMCS, has the responsibility to verify SEIU's majority status. It is therefore up
to the SMCS to determine whether the 84 'No Union' slips in fact have served to
negate the majority formed by the 569 SEIU authorization cards. However, in
this matter the SMCS has only provided the parties a tally and apparently has
relinquished this responsibility in this matter.").
97. Id. at 11.
98. Id. at 13 (citing Blue Grass Indus., Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 274, 290-91 (1987)).
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The panel then applied the new standard and held that the employer had unreasonably withheld recognition from the SEIU because
"the 'No Union' slips did not include any specific statement of intent to
revoke the SEIU authorization cards," particularly in light of the facts
that the slips were gathered over an extended period of time which
included a separate organizing campaign by a competing union, 9 9 and
"the District sanctioned a method for employees to show their intent
to no longer be represented by SEIU," which only five employees had
followed. 100
In the wake of this decision, PERB decided to promulgate regulations in the event that it was required to confront the revocation issue
again in the representation matters over which it had jurisdiction. O1
In its Initial Statement of Reasons for the proposed rulemaking, the
agency noted that passage of the card check bills
mean[s] that, in many cases, the review of the proof of support constitutes the
"election." This has led to heightened concerns and interest regarding employee awareness of the10significance
and consequences of the documents that
2
they are asked to sign.

The most notable new regulation proposed would have created a window period of fifteen days after notice that a petition for recognition
had been filed for a bargaining unit of educational employees10 3 for
employees to file revocations of their previously-signed authorization
cards. These revocations would have to have been substantially similar in form to what the panel in Antelope Valley had required. o4 The
agency also proposed altering its proof of support requirements for
card-check recognition petitions to require the petitioner to "clearly
demonstrate that the employee understands that an election may not
be conducted."O5
99. The employee who coordinated the collection of the slips testified as to his specific
intent to revoke SEIU authorization; however, the panel noted that "[h]is testimony regarding the other 83 employees comprises uncorroborated hearsay." Id.
at 12 n.7.
100. Id. at 12.
101. INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 49.
102. Id. at 2.
103. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, §§ 33060(c), 51035(c) (2007) (parallel provisions setting fifteen-day period for posting of notice of petition for recognition).
104. Text of Proposed Regulations, Title 8, Public Employment Relations Board, Proposed Regulations §§ 32705, 61025, 81025, 91025 (February 16, 2007), available
at http://www.perb.ca.gov/news/docs/14/Proposed%20Text.pdf (last visited Mar.
6, 2008). The agency gave as its reason that "the employee may not have an
opportunity, without the revocation process, to effectuate a change in his or her
intent to support the petitioner." INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 49.
105. Text of Proposed Regulations, supra note 104, at Proposed Regulations
§§ 32700(a)(1), 61020(a)(1), 81020(a)(1), 91020(a)(1). PERB also proposed to
eliminate its "prima facie evidence" threshold for allegations of fraud or coercion
in the obtaining of authorization cards that would trigger a PERB investigation
into such allegations. Id. at Proposed Regulations §§ 32700(g), 61020(f), 81020(f),
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These proposals elicited a strong reaction. The proportion of opinions on each side of the debate was distinctly different from the submissions in Dana Corp. After the NLRB granted review of that case,
twelve "[a]mici briefs or letters opposing the current voluntary recognition bar were submitted," 10 6 while ten "[almici briefs or letters supporting the current voluntary recognition bar were submitted"1O7-a
relatively even split. A total of eighteen separate comments were submitted to PERB in response to its proposed rulemaking, fifteen of
which opposed the changes, two of which supported them, and one
10 8
which did not take a position.
Among the commentators opposing the change were the authors of
the state Senate and Assembly bills that respectively established
card-check recognition for K-12 and higher education employees. The
legislators wrote that they had "never contemplated a revocation process that would permit an employee to revoke an authorization card at
any time," 10 9 and warned that PERB's proposed modifications "could
result in employers engaging in campaigns to encourage employees to
revoke, with just as much pressure, conflict and delay as previously
existed during pre-election periods." 1 10 The state Senator also opposed the addition of language to cards indicating that the signer understood there would be no election, as it "suggests that a card check
process is somehow invalid or is inferior to a traditional election."111
These arguments were echoed by other commentators, who argued
that a "central aim of the card check laws is the elimination of employer coercion,"112 but that the proposed revocation period "would
give employers a new window of opportunity in which to pressure
workers to revoke their support."113 It was also noted that the pro-

106.
107.
108.
109.

110.

111.
112.

113.

91020(f). The agency stated that the revision "intended to make it clear that any
such allegations, if supported by evidence, will be investigated and addressed in
the support determination finding." INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note
49.
Dana 11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007), 2007 WL 2891099 at *3 n.8.
Id. at *4 n.9.
Complete list of comments on file with the author.
Letter from Sen. Gilbert Cedillo to Tami R. Bogert, Gen. Counsel, Pub. Employment Relations Bd. (Apr. 10, 2007), available at http://www.perb.ca.gov/news/
docs/14/State%20Senator%2OCedillo%204-10-07.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
Letter from Assem. Loni Hancock to Tami R. Bogert, Gen. Counsel, Pub. Employment Relations Bd. (Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.perb.ca.gov/newsl
docs/14Assemblywoman%20Hancock%204-11-07.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
Letter from Sen. Cedillo, supra note 109.
Letter from Rebekah B. Evenson, Altshuler Berzon LLP, on behalf of SEIU Cal.
State Council, to Tami R. Bogert, Gen. Counsel, Pub. Employment Relations Bd.
at 1 (Apr. 6, 2007), available at http://www.perb.ca.gov/news/docs/14/SEIU%20
State%20Council%204-6-07.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
Letter from Caitlin Vega, Cal. Labor Fed'n, to Tami R. Bogert, Gen. Counsel,
Pub. Employment Relations Bd. at 2 (Apr. 9, 2007), available at http://
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posed regulations would conflict with settled NLRB114 precedents requiring that a petitioner demonstrate proof of majority "on a snapshot
basis," rather than make such a showing "over a given period of time,
which is what the proposed [revocation] regulations would effectively
require."115
Of the two comments submitted in support of the proposed
changes, only one spoke to the issues at hand.116 This comment noted
that, "[d]espite the continuing national debate over the desirability of
the card-check process, California did not wait for greater consensus
to emerge."11 7 It then warned that, "[w]ithout the ability to revoke an
authorization card, an employee would have no opportunity, as he or
she would in an election, to manifest a change of heart over union
support."118 Accordingly, the revocation period would allow for "a true
picture of union support" before recognition is granted, "and serves as
an effective and efficient means of checking union misconduct during
an organizing campaign."119
PERB ultimately decided to withdraw its proposed regulations establishing a revocation period and requiring a showing of employee
understanding that there may not be an election, 120 explaining that it
needed "to continue to discuss and explore possible changes in the

114.

115.

116.

117.

118.
119.
120.

www.perb.ca.gov/news/docs/14/California%20Labor%2OFederation%204-9-07.pdf
(last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
The state labor relations agencies in both California and Illinois take cognizance
of NLRB doctrines where they construe provisions of the NLRA that are similar
to state labor law. See, e.g., County of Imperial, PERB Decision No. 1916-M, 31
P.E.R.C. 120, at 18 n.10 (June 28, 2007); and Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun.
Employees, AFL-CIO v. State Labor Relations Bd., 546 N.E.2d 687, 690-91 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989).
Letter from Ari Krantz, Leonard Carder LLP, on behalf of various union locals, to
Tami R. Bogert, Gen. Counsel, Pub. Employment Relations Bd. at 2 (Apr. 5,
2007), available at http://www.perb.ca.gov/news/docs/14/AFSCME,%20FPTE,
%20Local%201%20&%20UPTE%204-4-2007.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2008). This
is ironically one of the arguments commonly made against card check and in
favor of elections. See, e.g., Dana 11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007), 2007 WL
2891099 at *8 ("[A] Board election presents a clear picture of employee voter preference at a single moment. On the other hand, card signings take place over a
protracted period of time.").
The other comment, from a unionized state employee, discussed the "pressure
tactics" of incumbent unions in decertification situations. Statement of Ira Eisenberg in Support of Proposed Rules Changes (Apr. 12, 2007), available at http:f/
www.perb.ca.gov/news/docs/14/Eisenberg%204-6-07.pdf (last visited Mar. 6,
2008).
Letter from Renne Sloan Holtzman Sakai LLP at 1 (Aug. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.perb.ca.gov/news/docs/14/Renne%20Sloan%20-%208-10-2007.pdf
(last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
The agency also retained the "prima facie" evidence standard for allegations of
misconduct in acquiring authorization cards. NOTICE OF PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, PUB. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BD. (June 12, 2007), available at http://
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area of proof of support," and "further research questions raised relative to the adoption of regulations concerning revocation of proof of
support."121
More recently, the issue of revocations again came before a PERB
panel, in the decertification context and under an entirely different
statute than the MMBA and the educational employment statutes, in
the State of California (Department of Personnel Administration)
case. 122 The panel took this opportunity to narrowly construe Antelope Valley's holding that employees had the right to revoke authorization cards, limiting the precedential value of the decision to "MMBA
card checks in which the interested parties do not dispute the right to
revoke or in effect by their acts acquiesce to such a right."1 2 3 The
question of whether most California employees even have the right to
revoke card check authorizations therefore remains entirely
unsettled.
C.

The Presumed Intent of the Illinois Card-Check Law

Around the same time, in Illinois, the question of the reliability of
card check was introduced by an appellate court into its review of the
regulations of one of the state's labor relations agencies. Illinois
amended its Public Labor Relations Act and Educational Labor Relations Act in 2003 to allow for card-check recognition,1 24 again, like
California, without significant legislative opposition.1 25 However,
many of the same concerns about card check, which have been expressed in other contexts, were raised in regard to this bill on the state
House and Senate floors. These concerns included: whether "the company may be able to present their side of the collective bargaining issue;" the fact that "some people have been known to change their
www.perb.ca.gov/news/docs/14/Notice%20of%/o20Proposed%20Modifications.pdf
(last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
121.

122.
123.
124.

125.

FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, PUB. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BD. at 2 (October

18, 2007), available at http://www.perb.ca.gov/news/docs/14/Final%20Statement
%20of%20Reasons.pdf.
PERB Order No. Ad-367-S (Nov. 6, 2007), available at http://www.perb.ca.gov/
decisionbank/pdfs/A367S.pdf.
Id. at 11.
2003 Ill. Legis. Serv. 93-444 (West) (adding, inter alia, new subsection (a-5) to 5
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 315/9 (2007) and new subsection (c-5) to 115 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 5/7 (2007)).
See, e.g., T. Shawn Taylor, Labor's Springfield Friends Come Through;
Blagojevich Leads Legislative Charge, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 2003, at C1 ("Among
the legislative victories for unions is a law that allows public and education employees to form unions if a majority sign cards giving their consent. The so-called
'card check' law will help unions forgo the long election process that union leaders
have argued gives employers time to thwart organizing efforts with intimidation
tactics.").
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mind;" 12 6 that the bill detracted from "the sanctity of a secret ballot;"127 and that it "[took] away the right of the person to make a vote
128

whether or not they want to organize . . . free of pressure."
On August 24, 2007, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second
District issued a decision in County of DuPage v. Illinois Labor Relations Board,129 wherein it construed the language of the card-check

statute, specifically the portion of it that directs the Illinois Labor Relations Board (the "ILRB") to designate a bargaining representative
"on the basis of dues deduction authorization and other evidence." 130
In County of DuPage, the Metropolitan Alliance of Police (the "MAP"),
a union which had twice before been rejected in a secret-ballot vote to

represent a unit of county sheriffs deputies,13 1 filed a card-check representation petition for these employees after passage of Illinois's
card-check statute. The MAP won this card-check count, but its certification as bargaining representative was overturned on appeal. 13 2
Another petition was filed by the union, the MAP once again won the
card-check count, and the ILRB's certification of the union was again
appealed. 133 One of the bases for the county's appeal was that the
MAP had submitted only authorization cards as evidence of its majority support, pursuant to the ILRB's regulations, which allowed that
proof of support could "consist of authorizationcards, petitions, or any
other evidence." 13 4 The court struck the ILRB regulation in question
because of its "conflict with the plain requirements of section 9(a-5),"
126. Transcript, Illinois House of Representatives, 93rd General Assembly, Regular
Session, 38th Legislative Day (March 31, 2003), reprintedat Ii. H.R. Tran. 2003
Reg. Sess. No. 38 (statement of Rep. Black).
127. Transcript, Illinois Senate, 93rd General Assembly, Regular Session, 44th Legislative Day (May 13, 2003), reprinted at I1. S. Tran. 2003 Reg. Sess. No. 44 (statement of Sen. Roskam).
128. Transcript, Illinois Senate 93rd General Assembly, Regular Session, 50th Legislative Day (May 21, 2003), reprinted at I1. S. Tran. 2003 Reg. Sess. No. 50 (statement of Sen. Righter).
129. 874 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), appeal allowed, County of DuPage v. Ill. Labor Relations Bd., State Panel (County ofDuPage II), 879 N.E.2d 930 (Ill. 2007).
130. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 315/9-a-5 (2007) (emphasis added). The card-check amendment to the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act contains identical language.
See 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/7-c-5 (2007). This language was apparently taken
verbatim from a similar New York statute. Transcript, Illinois House of Representatives, 38th Legislative Day, supra note 126 (statement of Rep. McKeon).
See also 4 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 4, § 201.9(g)(1) (2008) (choice of employees as to bargaining representative "may be ascertained.., on the basis of
dues deduction authorizations and other evidence instead of by an election").
However, it does not appear that this question of statutory interpretation has
ever been litigated in that state.
131. County of DuPage, 874 N.E.2d at 322.
132. Id. at 323.
133. Id. at 323-24.
134. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 80, § 1210.80(d)(2)(A) (2004) (emphasis added).
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addition to the authorinamely that there must be "other evidence" in
13 5
zation cards that the union had submitted.
The ILRB and the union argued that the "and" in question was
disjunctive, not conjunctive, and made a number of textual arguments
in support of this position. They pointed out that the usage of "and" in
the subsequent sentence of the statute (relating to such evidence being obtained by fraud or coercion) was clearly disjunctive. The court
disagreed, although it conceded that "[b]oth parties' constructions of
section 9(a-5) are reasonable." 136 It then distinguished the fraud-orcoercion sentence based on the placement of a comma before the "and,"
which it held made the usage disjunctive. 13 7 The court then contrasted the 3required showing of interest for a secret-ballot election (a
"petition")1 s with the language of the card check statute, looking at
the legislative history to conclude that
the legislature intended and understood that the showing of majority interest
pursuant to section 9(a-5) would be an equivalent to the election process. It
makes sense, then, that the majority interest showing requires a specific evidentiary burden while the showing of interest in the election provision, which
and not subject to judicial review, does not
has been held to be preliminary
139
specify an evidentiary burden.

140
The decision is now on appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.
Here, once again, the concerns expressed by the Board and PERB
can be seen in the appellate court's approach to this relatively narrow
question of statutory construction. Its reading of the legislative history of the card-check statute led the Appellate Court of Illinois to impute to the legislature an intent to require a higher evidentiary
burden for showing employee support through card check, based most
notably on the fact that such a showing would not be corroborated by a
secret-ballot election.

IV.

THE ASYMMETRY OF WORKPLACE POWER: A
FOUNDING PRINCIPLE OF THE NLRA

The common thread running through the federal, California, and
Illinois situations is a lack of comfort with the reliability and accuracy
of authorization cards in demonstrating employee support to an employer. Implicit, and oftentimes explicit, in this concern is the specter
of union coercion, misconduct, intimidation, and fraud. This lack of
comfort on the part of courts and agencies has produced a range of
responses, from hesitation to vehement opposition, and have all re135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

County of DuPage, 874 N.E.2d at 330.
Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 327-28.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 315/9-(a)(1) (2007).
County of DuPage, 874 N.E.2d at 329 (citation omitted).
2007).
County of DuPage 11, 879 N.E.2d 930 (Ill.
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sulted in the enactment (or, in the case of California, the attempted
enactment) of procedural constraints on the process of gaining cardcheck recognition.
In coming to these results, the courts and agencies appear to have
accepted at face value, without any significant factual inquiry or record evidence, the necessary premise that the potential for union misconduct was a serious enough threat to employee free choice to merit
the actions taken. Although the argument that existing mechanisms
could effectively address any such fraud or coercion issues was available, and was made, in every situation, these arguments were not addressed. The potential for employer misconduct in the card-check
process was similarly not addressed, despite the longstanding recognition in Board jurisprudence that conduct in solicitation of cards that
indicates an alignment with the employer's position has a greater po14
tential to be coercive.
Judicial skepticism about the accuracy of card check is certainly
not new. 14 2 Concern among legislators can be seen as early as the
time of consideration of the original NLRA, the Wagner Act, 14 3 in
1934 and 1935, when "[plartisans of management were especially
alarmed," about the language of section 9(c) of the Act, which allowed
the NLRB to determine representation either through a secret ballot
or "any other suitable method."' 4 4 These critics
alleg[ed] a threat to the democratic process, testifying that only a secret ballot
was "fair" and "free from union coercion." According to the Vice President of
General Motors, "The rule of 'and other suitable method' is entirely too vague
145
to be workable and is subject to grave abuse."

Coercion, misrepresentation, and fraud by unions or union adherents in the distribution and collection of authorization cards certainly
occurs, and examples can be found throughout the jurisprudence of
the Board.146 These arguments have had such a longstanding place in
141. See, e.g., Millsboro Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 879, 880 (1999)
("[Iun the cases cited by the dissent, both the employer and the supervisor opposed the union. Therefore, an employee solicited by a supervisor to revoke his
authorization card would readily perceive the supervisor as speaking and acting
on behalf of higher management. Thus, the two situations vary greatly in their
coercive tendencies. .. ").
142. See, e.g., NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 565 (4th Cir. 1967) ("It
would be difficult to imagine a more unreliable method of ascertaining the real
wishes of employees than a 'card check,' unless it were an employer's request for
an open show of hands."), overruled by NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,
590 (1969).
143. Pub. L. No. 74-372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
144. Becker, supra note 4, at 505-06.
145. Id. at 506 (alteration in original).
146. See Brief of the HR Policy Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
at Appx. A, Dana H, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007), 2007 WL 2891099 (listing 113
"[clases illustrating the long history of using deception, coercion, and other
abuses in the solicitation of authorization cards"). But see Strengthening
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the historical debate that they were discussed and ruled upon by the
U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 1 4 7 thirty-five
years after the beginning of the session of Congress during which the
NLRA was first passed. It was thirty-five years after Gissel Packing
that the Board granted review in Dana Corp., as if the answer to this
particular question has a half-life in the policy-making realm that had
expired once again.
The Chief Justice's opinion in Gissel Packing so thoroughly
previewed and discussed the present-day arguments regarding card
check, as discussed above, that both the majority and dissent in the
Dana Corp. decision cite to that opinion for different propositions.148
Gissel Packing also appeared on both sides of the briefing in Dana
Corp., and in the EFCA and PERB policy debates. 14 9 The primary
holding of Gissel Packing, which created a new class of Board remedy,
the "Gissel bargaining order,"150 was that union authorization cards
"are reliable enough to support a bargaining order where a fair election probably could not have been held, or where an election that was
held was in fact set aside," due to Unfair Labor Practices committed
by the employer.151 There were a number of important holdings made
by the Court that supported this determination, and which address
most of the arguments in the current debate, as discussed in detail
below.
Rarely cited in comparison to this well-known portion of the Gissel
Packing decision is the rationale expressed in section IV of the opinion, which dealt with the final and least meritorious of the petitioners'
claims in the four consolidated appeals for which certiorari had been
granted.15 2 Chief Justice Warren, in rejecting the petitioners' chal-

147.
148.
149.

150.

151.

152.

America's Middle Class, supra note 23, at 9 (statement of Nancy Schiffer, Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO) (arguing that "only 42 [of those] decisions since
the Act's inception ... actually found coercion, fraud or misrepresentation in the
signing of union authorization forms").
395 U.S. 575.
Dana 11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28, *6, *21 (2007), 2007 WL 2891099.
See Amicus Brief of the General Counsel, supra note 67, at 3 n.3; Petitioners'
Joint Brief on the Merits, supra note 72, at 24; The Employee Free Choice Act:
Restoring Economic Opportunity for Working Families, supra note 41 (statement
of Peter J. Hurtgen); Letter from Caitlin Vega, Cal. Labor Fed'n, supra note 113.
See generally Memorandum from Fred Feinstein, General Counsel, NLRB,
Guideline Memorandum Concerning Gissel, Memorandum GC 99-08 (Nov. 10,
1999), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared-files/GC%2OMemo/1999/gc998.html (discussing standards for imposition of Gissel bargaining order).
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 601 n.18. The case is generally cited by opponents
of card-check organizing for the proposition that "secret elections are generally
the most satisfactory-indeed the preferred-method of ascertaining whether a
union has majority support." Id. at 602; see Petitioners' Joint Brief on the Merits,
supra note 72, at 24.
See Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 579-80 (discussing the procedural posture of
the various appeals).
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lenge to the Board's regulation of employer speech during a union representation campaign under the First Amendment, 15 3 sketched the
parameters of the intellectual framework which guided the Court that
day. It is the inversion-or the absence-of such a framework in the
policymaking minds of today that is part of the reason for the starkly
contrary decisions that have been reached of late.
The Court first made clear "that an employer's free speech right to
communicate his views to his employees is firmly established and cannot be infringed by a union or the Board," noting that the 1947 TaftHartley amendments to the NLRA154 "implement[ed] the First
Amendment," by declaring that non-coercive employer speech cannot
alone constitute an Unfair Labor Practice.15 5 The Court then warned,
however, that "an employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights
of the employees to associate freely," as those rights were embodied in
the NRLA:156
[a]nd any balancing of those rights must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of
the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of
the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested
ear.157

By invoking this asymmetry of power and the effect that it has on
otherwise permissible speech made in the workplace, the Court
brought its decision in Gissel Packing into line with one of the dominant analytical frameworks of labor law jurisprudence in that era.
The preamble to the NLRA158 refers to the "inequality of bargaining
power" between workers and employers as the reason for the statutory
153. Id. at 618.
154. Pub. L. No. 80-114, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-163
(2006)).
155. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 617 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(c)) ("The expressing of
any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an
unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.").
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. As the predecessor to every state's public-sector labor relations statutes, the
NLRA has had a great deal of influence on the goals and application of these
statutes. See, e.g., Douglas E. Ray, Jennifer Gallagher, & Nancy A. Butler, Regulating Union RepresentationElection Campaign Tactics: A Comparative Study of
Private and Public Sector Approaches, 66 NEB. L. REV. 532, 532-33 (1987) ("Because the National Labor Relations Act... far predates the collective bargaining
laws of the approximately forty states authorizing public employee collective bargaining, it is not surprising that it has substantially influenced public employee
labor law.") (footnotes omitted); see also Admin. Office of Ill. Courts. v. State &
Mun. Teamsters, Local 726, 657 N.E.2d 972, 982 (Ill. 1995) ("The model of governance found in the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act has been borrowed from
private sector bargaining. It must be recognized, however, that large differences
exist between public and private employers.").
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enactment of collective bargaining rights. 159 One commentator, in analyzing the historical context in which the NLRA's election machinery
was created, likened the creation of industrial democracy to "a new
variant of [the] problem at the heart of liberal political theory-the
problem of reconciling the dependence of wage earners with the personal independence deemed essential to citizenship."160
In regulating election conduct by all parties under the Act, the
Board and the courts initially remained mindful of these dynamics in
their approaches, 16 1 and did so not only in relation to employer
speech, as in Gissel Packing, but to the conduct of employers as well.
Supreme Court Justice Harlan memorably referred to the actions of
employers as the "fist in the velvet glove," in his majority opinion in
NLRB v. Exchange Parts,162 which held that the unconditional grant
of benefits by an employer to employees, while a representation election was pending, was a violation of those employees' self-organization
rights under the NLRA. The opinion explained that, "[e]mployees are
not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow and
which may dry up if it is not obliged."163
In Exchange Parts,the employer announced to its employees, a few
days prior to being notified by the union that an organizing campaign
was underway, that they would receive an additional "floating holiday" the following year.164 Six days after the Board issued an election
order, the employer held a dinner for the employees, where they voted
on whether they would take the extra "floating holiday" on their birthdays. In addition, the employer's Vice President and General Manager gave a speech about the upcoming election where he, among
other things, "pointed out the benefits obtained by the employees
without a union."165 A little over a week later, the employer sent a
letter to employees listing all the benefits it provided to employees,
including the new "floating holiday" and two additional, previously159. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (referring to the "inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract,
and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association").
160. Becker, supra note 4, at 499.
161. But see id. ("The political analogy facilitated a style of argument that presumed
the equality of employers and unions as players in the union election process.").
162. 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964). The Chief Justice had also contributed to this line of
jurisprudence. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357, 368
(1958) ("Employees during working hours are the classic captive audience.").
163. Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. at 409. The opinion expressly did not rely on any
"words of [the employer] dissociated from its conduct," and cited to the Taft-Hartley-introduced "employer free speech" provision at § 8(c) of the Act as the reason
for this. Id. at 409 n.3 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(c)).
164. Id. at 406.
165. Id. at 406-07.

356
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unannounced benefits. It also pointed out in this letter "the fact that
it is the Company that puts things in your envelope," and that "[t]he
Union can't put any of those things in your envelope-only the Company can do that."166 The Court held that the Act:
prohibits not only intrusive threats and promises but also conduct immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the express purpose of
impinging upon their freedom of choice1 6for
or against unionization and is rea7
sonably calculated to have that effect.

The Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that "in this
case the questioned conduct stood in isolation" of any other unlawful
conduct by the employer, holding that "when as here the motive [behind a grant of benefits while an election is pending] is otherwise established, an employer is not free to violate § 8(a)(1) [of the Act] by
conferring benefits simply because it refrains from other, more obvis
ous violations."16
This understanding of the ways in which employer speech and conduct in particular contexts are received by employees was probably
expressed in its most florid form by Judge Learned Hand in the early
years of the Wagner Act, when he noted that the words of an employer
in the workplace are not "pebbles in alien juxtaposition," heard and
69
understood in isolation from the setting in which they were spoken.1
Based on this understanding, the Board for the most part in its early
years applied analytical presumptions to the potential misconduct of
employers,170 the implications of whose actions towards employees
were not always amenable to factual inquiry. Even after passage of
166. Id. at 407 (emphasis omitted).
167. Id. at 409.
168. Id. at 410. The line ofjurisprudence that has come out of this decision has been
the target of some deserved criticism. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman, Stephen B.
Goldberg, & Jeanne B. Herman, NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics: The BehavioralAssumptions on Which the BoardRegulates, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1477
(1975) ("The theory on which promises or grants of benefits are assumed to interfere with rational decisionmaking [sic] has never been fully articulated by the
Board.... The Board has in some cases, by citing Exchange Parts,suggested a
wholly different explanation for treating grants and promises of benefits as illegal.") (footnote omitted); Charles C. Jackson & Jeffrey S. Heller, Promises and
Grants of Benefits Under the National Labor Relations Act, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
24-25 (1982) ("Exchange Parts also has the unintended result of encouraging
campaign gamesmanship. Subtle techniques of persuasion are encouraged in
place of free and open disclosure of what proponents may be willing to do for
employees.").
169. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
170. See, e.g., Am. Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 133 (1942), rev'd 134 F.2d 933
(2d. Cir. 1943) (rejecting notion that employer was candidate in representation
election and holding unlawful employer campaign speech that "attained a force
stronger than [its] intrinsic connotation, and beyond that of persuasion .... " ).
But see generally Becker, supra note 4, at 532-46 (discussing eventual disfavor of
American Tube and the trend towards application of the political election model
to labor representation election jurisprudence).
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the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947, which were broadly intended
to regulate union conduct under the Act in the same manner as employer conduct,171 the Board, with the approval of the Supreme Court,
applied the Act's prohibitions on union misconduct in a far more limrestrictions on emited manner, citing the differing language of the
72
ployer and union conduct contained in the Act.1
One of the Board's responses to the Taft-Hartley amendments was
to create in 1948173 the "laboratory conditions" doctrine as its intellectual framework for the regulation of representation elections, and this
framework still governs the Board today. The laboratory conditions
standard derives from the Board's belief that "it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted,
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees." 174 In such a setting, "[c]onduct that
creates an atmosphere which renders improbable a free choice will
sometimes warrant invalidating an election, even though that conduct
may not constitute an unfair labor practice," and "the experiment
must be conducted over again."17 5 The standard's express analogy to
the scientific method, and its accompanying emphasis on the circumstances and theoretical ramifications of conduct rather than their actual effects, has provided a potent means for the Board to disregard or
abandon many of the foundational presumptions of the Act, such as
the asymmetrical effect of an employer's speech and conduct in comparison to an employee's. 1 76 By the 1970's, the Board had begun to

171. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1533-35 (2002) (discussing the context in which Taft-Hartley "amended section 7 to affirm employees' right to refrain from concerned activity, and added section 8(b), which prohibited unions from coercing or
discriminating against employees, from refusing to bargain, and from engaging
in secondary boycotts . . . .") (emphasis omitted).

172. See, e.g., NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local 639 (CurtisBros. Inc.), 362
U.S. 274, 285-91 (1960) (declining to construe prohibitions on union picketing as
broadly as prohibitions on employer conduct, consistent with legislative history
explaining the differences between § 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1),
prohibiting employer interference with employees' exercise of rights under the
Act, and § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), which prohibits union restraint of
such rights).
173. Gen. Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
174. Id at 127.
175. Id at 126-27.
176. See generally Jennifer Dillard & Joel F. Dillard, Fetishizingthe ElectoralProcess:
The NLRB's ProblematicEmbrace of Electoral Formalism, EFMA 2003 Helsinki
Meetings, at 31, Aug. 28, 2007, available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1009636
("[Dlespite the Board's best intentions, the rules developed under the laboratory
conditions standard became more and more formalistic, and less and less protective of employee free choice under intense judicial scrutiny.").
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equate the presumptive effects of comparable union and employer
misconduct on the laboratory conditions of an election.177
The recent emphasis on the potential for union misconduct in the
card-check context exists in the absence of any factual inquiry into
what potential actually exists and whether existing mechanisms are
capable of addressing such misconduct. The Board's willingness to
contemplate the specter of such misconduct, but its lack of interest in
actually exploring whether such conduct is indeed a worthy concern,
signals that it has journeyed towards a precise inversion of the original understandings that led to the passage of the NLRA. This 180
degree turn in doctrine can be seen in the differing ways the Court in
Gissel Packing came down on many of the same concerns that
animated the Board in the Dana Corp. decision.
V.

THE INVERSION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GISSEL
PACKING BY THE BOARD IN DANA CORP.

The questions of the reliability of cards and the potential for union
178
misconduct in card check were front and center in Gissel Packing.
Three of the four consolidated cases that came before the Supreme
Court in that case were appeals of decisions of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals. In each case, the union demanded recognition from
the employer on the basis of authorization cards signed by a majority
of employees. "All three employers refused to bargain on the ground
that authorization cards were inherently unreliable indicators of employee desires; and they either embarked on, or continued, vigorous
antiunion campaigns that gave rise to numerous unfair labor practice
charges," 179 including "coercively interrogating employees about
Union activities, threatening them with discharge, and promising
them benefits," "creating the appearance of surveillance, and offering
benefits for opposing the Union," and "wrongfully discharg[ing] employees for engaging in Union activities."so
177. See, e.g., NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973) (applying the Exchange
Partsrule on unconditional grants of benefits to hold unlawful union promise to
waive initiation fees for card signers); see also Millsboro Nursing & Rehab. Ctr.,
Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 829, 881 (1999) (Hurtgen, Member, dissenting) ("[Wihen a supervisor asks an employee to sign a union authorization card, the employee is
asked, in a most graphic way, to openly declare himself on the issue of unionization. Similarly, if a supervisor asks an employee to withdraw a union authorization card, the employee is being asked to openly declare himself on the issue of
unionization. Since the latter conduct is objectionable, I believe that the former is
objectionable as well ....
The solicitation itself, by a supervisor to a vulnerable
employee, contains the 'seed' of coercion.") (footnote omitted). But see Becker,
supra note 4, at 569-85 (criticizing the development of this doctrine of "mutuality" of unions and employers in regulation of election conduct).
178. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
179. Id. at 580.
180. Id. at 583.
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In each case, the Board found that "the employer's refusal to bargain with the Union in violation of § 8(a)(5) was motivated, not by a
'good faith' doubt of the Union's majority status, but by a desire to
gain time to dissipate that status."181 The "fact that the employers
had committed substantial unfair labor practices during their antiunion campaign efforts to resist recognition" was the basis for the
Board's disbelief that the employers had acted in good faith in refusing to bargain.' 8 2 The Board also "found that all three employers had
engaged in restraint and coercion of employees in violation of
§ 8(a)(1)," and that two of the three employers "had wrongfully discharged employees for engaging in Union activities in violation of
3
§ 8(a)(3)."18
The Fourth Circuit "sustained the Board's findings as to the
§§ 8(a)(1) and (3) violations, but rejected the Board's findings that the
employers' refusal to bargain violated § 8(a)(5),"' 18 4 holding "that the
cards themselves were so inherently unreliable that their use gave an
employer virtually an automatic, good faith claim" that employee sentiment was in "dispute," warranting a secret-ballot election.i85
The fourth consolidated case in Gissel Packing came out of the
First Circuit Court of Appeals. The union in that case had made a
request for recognition based on authorization cards it had collected
from employees, but the employer refused, asserting "a good faith
doubt of majority status because of the cards' inherent unreliability
,186 The union then petitioned for a representation election, dur"1...
ing the campaign for which the employer made a number of statements to employees to the effect that the union was a "strike happy
outfit," that "a possible strike would jeopardize the continued operation of the plant," and "that because of their age and the limited usefulness of their skills outside their craft, the employees might not be
able to find re-employment if they lost their jobs as a result of a
strike."187
The Board found that these communications, "when considered as
a whole, 'reasonably tended to convey to the employees the belief or
impression that selection of the Union in the forthcoming election
could lead [the Company] to close its plant, or to the transfer of the
weaving production, with the resultant loss of jobs .
*..."'188 The
Board set the election aside and ordered the employer to bargain, and
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 582-83.
at 583.
at
at
at
at
at

585.
585-86.
587.
588-89.
589 (alteration in original).
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its opinion was sustained in its entirety by the First Circuit.189 In
upholding the Board, the court "rejected the Company's proposition
that the inherent unreliability of authorization cards entitled an employer automatically to insist on an election, noting that the representative status of a union may be shown by means other than an election
...."190 In great part because of the split between these two circuit
courts on the reliability of authorization cards in assessing employee
intent, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the
cases for review.1 9 1
Despite the prevalence of the issue of the reliability of cards in the
four cases that made up Gissel Packing, "there were no allegations of
irregularities" in all but one of those cases, and the trial examiner in
that last campaign found there was insufficient evidence to support
the allegations there. 192 Nevertheless, the issues of coercion and misrepresentation in the solicitation of authorization cards were raised in
the arguments before the Court in much the same way they were
raised in the arguments in Dana Corp. The Court summarized the
arguments made by the employers in Gissel Packing on these issues
as follows:
[C]ards cannot accurately reflect an employee's wishes... because the choice
was the result of group pressures and not individual decision made in the
privacy of a voting booth... [and] cards are too often obtained through misrepresentation and coercion
which compound the cards' inherent inferiority to
193
the election process.

"Neither contention is persuasive," the Court concluded, "and each
proves too much." 194 Even in light of the Board's recognition "that
secret elections are generally the most satisfactory-indeed the preferred-method of ascertaining whether a union has majority support," this "does not mean that cards are thereby rendered totally
invalid, for where an employer engages in conduct disruptive of the
election process, cards may be the most effective-perhaps the onlyway of assuring employee choice." 1 95
In response to the fear that "an employee may, in a card drive,
succumb to group pressures or sign simply to get the union 'off his
back,'" the Court made the obvious point that "the same pressures are
likely to be equally present in an election."1 96 As for the fact that an
employee who signs a card that is later used as the basis to recognize a
bargaining representative is thereby "unable to change his mind as he
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

590.
590.
606.
602.

at 603-04.
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would be free to do once inside a voting booth," the Court noted that
"no voter, of course, can change his mind after casting a ballot in an
election even though he may think better of his choice shortly
97
thereafter."1
The employers in Gissel Packing had also argued that cards could
not accurately reflect employee sentiment "because an employer has
not had a chance to present his views and thus a chance to insure that
the employee choice was an informed one . . ."198 For example, the
"employers argue[d] that their employees cannot make an informed
choice because the card drive will be over before the employer has had
a chance to present his side of the unionization issues."19 9 The Court
was equally skeptical of the merits of this argument, noting first that,
"[niormally... the union will inform the employer of its organization
drive early in order to subject the employer to the unfair labor practice
provisions of the Act," and second that, "in all of the cases here [but
one] . . . the employer . . . was aware of the union's organizing drive
almost at the outset and began its antiunion campaign at that time
.... "200 Even the odd employer in the case who had not learned about
the organizing drive at its outset learned of it early enough "to deliver
2
a speech before the union obtained a majority." O1
The Court acknowledged that "[w]e would be closing our eyes to
obvious difficulties, of course, if we did not recognize that there have
been abuses, primarily arising out of misrepresentations by union organizers ... ."202 But there was already a mechanism for addressing
such concerns. "[Iun any specific case of alleged irregularity in the solicitation of the cards, the proper course is to apply the Board's customary standards . . . and rule that there was no majority if the
standards were not satisfied." 20 3 The Court then discussed the
Board's Cumberland Shoe204 doctrine, which is still applied by the
present-day Board in deciding the authenticity and accuracy of signed
employee authorization cards where claims of misrepresentation or
coercion in the acquisition of those cards are made. 205 The Court in
Gissel Packing noted that, at that time, "various courts of appeal and
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 604.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 602-03.
144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963).
See, e.g., Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 1996 WL 33321556 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges,
Apr. 25, 1996) (citing Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268, and Levi
Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 732 (1963), for standards in determining purpose of
card signers, and separately noting that the "key question" of card authenticity
"is that of whether from all circumstances any given card appears to genuinely
express a timely desire for representation ....

).
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commentators [had] differed significantly as to the effectiveness of
the" doctrine. 20 6 The question before the Court, as it saw it, was
"whether the Cumberland Shoe doctrine [was] an adequate rule under
the Act for assuring employee free choice." 20 7 In deciding this question, the Court first expressed its belief that
employees should be bound by the clear language of what they sign unless
that language is deliberately and clearly canceled by a union adherent with
the signer to disregard and forget the language
words calculated to 2direct
08
above his signature.

Furthermore, the Court did not "agree with the employers here
that employees as a rule are too unsophisticated to be bound by what
they sign unless expressly told that their act of signing represents
something else," 20 9 noting other areas of labor law where "Congress
has expressly authorized reliance on employee signatures . . . even
where criminal sanctions hang in the balance." 2 10 Finally, the Court
upheld the Board's Cumberland Shoe approach to card-check misconduct, but warned that "trial examiners should not neglect their obligation to ensure employee free choice by a too easy mechanical
application of the Cumberland Shoe rule."2 1 1 The Court also "reject[ed] any rule that requires a probe of an employee's subjective
motivations as involving an endless and unreliable inquiry," noting
that
employees are more likely than not, many months after a card drive and in
response to questions by company counsel, to give testimony damaging to the
repriunion, particularly where company officials have previously2 1threatened
2
sals for union activity in violation of § 8(a)(1) [of the Act].

It is not being argued herein that Gissel Packing stands for the
proposition that card check recognition should be the general rule.
The decision explicitly did not address "a union's right to rely on cards
as a freely interchangeable substitute for elections where there has
"..",213
The employers in all of those
been no election interference ..
cases had interfered with protected activity, and so all of the Court's
findings were made in the context of such employer misconduct. But,
as section IV of the opinion illustrates, the Court's analysis began
from a point where certain categories of employer conduct were presumed to be able to affect the representation election atmosphere neg206. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 604.
207. Id. at 606. The Court limited its holding to the "single-purpose" cards used in the
cases before it, which "stat[ed] clearly and unambiguously on their face that the
signer designated the union as his representative," rather than that the signer
sought an election. Id. (emphasis added).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 607.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 607-08.
212. Id. at 608.
213. Id. at 601 n.18.
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atively. When such conduct rose to a certain level, the Court was
comfortable relying on authorization cards to create collective-bargaining obligations, due to its confidence in the Board's procedures for
determining majority support and addressing allegations of union or
employee misconduct. This is a level of comfort that the Board does
not appear to be able to provide anymore.
The new focus of the Board begins with the question of whether the
employer in question has sufficient information to decide whether to
opt in or out of the collective-bargaining process. This has been the
longstanding focus of another strain of labor law, and it has now been
imported into the card check context. This approach carries with it a
presumption of union misconduct, and an absence of any concern
about the potential for employer misconduct. 214 The effects of this approach can be seen in how the Dana Corp. majority discussed and
21 5
ruled upon identical arguments to the ones made in Gissel Packing.
On the issue of group pressure and the accuracy of authorization
cards in such an environment, the Board in Dana Corp. held (without
citation):
Card checks are less reliable because they lack the secrecy and procedural
safeguards of an election, and employees may change their minds after signthe issue, but they may hesitate publicly
ing the cards and further exploring
2 16
to withdraw their signed cards.

The dissent, citing Gissel Packing, noted that "the same is true of
[the] employee antiunion petitions" that the majority wished to en2 7
courage with the fourty-five-day decertification window it created. 1
The Board majority disagreed, stating "there is an obvious difference,"
namely that such an antiunion petition only "obtains a secret-ballot
election." 2 is As discussed in the next section below, this is no longer
the case after the Board's decision, issued on the same day as Dana
214. This is despite abundant evidence that employer misconduct is quite prevalent in
representation election campaigns. See Brudney, supra note 8, at 870 ("By 1990,
there were incidents of unlawful termination in fully 25% of all organizing campaigns: one out of every fifty union supporters in an election campaign could expect to be victimized by such conduct. A more recent study estimated that by the
late 1990's, one out of every eighteen workers who participated in a union organizing campaign was the object of unlawful discrimination.").
215. See, e.g., Brief of the HR Policy Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 146, at 15, 27 (arguing that, "[e]ven in the best of circumstances, an employee is likely to feel the influence of peer pressure from prounion coworkers to sign the card," and "the substantial evidence of the lack of
safeguards and potential for deception and coercion in the card-check procedure
makes clear" that voluntary recognition bar should be abolished); Petitioners'
Joint Brief on the Merits, supra note 72, at 36 ("The overarching question in this
case is whether the employer-recognized union, the UAW, actually has the uncoerced support of a majority of employees.").
216. Dana 11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007), 2007 WL 2891099.
217. Id. at *21.
218. Id. at *7 n.19.
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Corp., in Wurtland Nursing & Rehabilitation Center,2 19 which allowed an employer to withdraw from bargaining based on an employee
petition asking for a decertification election.
The Dana Corp. majority also cast doubt on the usefulness of
Board Unfair Labor Practice charge processes to police card-check
misconduct, on the basis that the "laboratory conditions" standard for
election interference is a lower threshold than the threshold for a
ULP, and therefore there would be a class of card-check misconduct
that would be actionable in an election but not otherwise. 2 20 The
Board did not discuss the role that its existing proof-of-support standards, which would not count any cards obtained through misconduct, 22 1 would play in such a situation. Finally, the Board expressed
concern that, "[elven if no misrepresentations are made, employees
may not have the same degree of information about the pros and cons
of unionization that they would in a contested Board election, particularly if an employer has pledged neutrality during the card-solicita2 22
tion process."
The latter comment about employer neutrality highlights the most
notable issue discussed in Dana Corp. that was not previewed in Gissel Packing: the use of voluntary-recognition card-check and neutrality agreements by unions to secure advance agreement from an
223
employer to abide by the wishes of a majority of card signers.
There has been some scholarly analysis of the election process that
questions whether employer opposition in a representation election is
219. 351 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (2007), 2007 WL 2963268. However, one important difference between the two situations is that a union from which recognition has been
withdrawn may thereafter petition again for representation. See, e.g., Levitz
Furniture Co. of the Pac., Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 719-20 (2001). In contrast, a
union granted recognition in the first instance could not, prior to Dana Corp., face
a decertification petition until expiration of the recognition bar.
220. Dana 11, 2007 WL 2891099 at *7 n.19.
221. The Board is able to take such action even in the absence of an Unfair Labor
Practice charge. NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL §§ 11028.1 (fraud, misconduct),
11029 (forgery).
222. Dana11, 2007 WL 2891099 at *8. Employer neutrality was important in making
this point. The Board separately in the opinion acknowledged that in card check,
"in many instances, including the present cases, the recognized union has taken
months or even in excess of a year to solicit the necessary majority showing of
support." Id. at *13. The Board did not see this length of time as an opportunity
for employees "to fully discuss their views concerning collective-bargaining representation," however. Id. Instead, it oddly cited the length of card-check campaigns as the basis for a longer decertification window than the Board's General
Counsel had sought, holding that "30 days is not a very long time for such discourse and action," and invited "the recognized union and the employer" to participate in the discussion. Id. Apparently the Board majority presumed that no
such dialogue occurs during the card-check campaign, and that employees are
instead subjected to an unceasing barrage of pro-union propaganda.
223. See generally Brudney, supra note 8, at 825-31 (discussing recent history of card
check and neutrality agreements).
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a necessary predicate for the adequate expression of employee free
choice,2 24 including specifically in the context of a card-check and neutrality agreement. 225 As noted above, Chief Justice Warren expressed
his own skepticism in Gissel Packing that an employer would ever de2 26
cline to present its side of the issue in a union election.
Nevertheless, the petitioners in Dana Corp. drew a dire picture of
card-check organizing under the shadow of private neutrality agreements. 22 7 Many of the most potent images of asymmetrical employer
power were evoked here. The managers of Dana Corporation "held a
series of company-paid captive audience meetings at the plant," where
they praised their agreement with the UAW.228 "With a wink and a
nod, it was implied that Dana Upper Sandusky would lose work opportunities or jobs if employees did not sign cards and bring in the
UAW."229 At Metaldyne, "management held a mandatory meeting
with the employees and played a video informing them that they
should accept the UAW in the plant as it was a 'win-win situation for
all of us."' 23 0 One amicus warned that, when faced with a union "corporate campaign" to get an employer to agree to a card-check and neutrality agreement, "the employer's primary concern is typically selfpreservation, not preservation of its employees' right of freedom of
choice regarding union representation." 23 1 It is not at all axiomatic
that card-check campaigns include wholesale pro-union conduct by
employers, for whom a variety of means by which to get their message
out still exist, even when a neutrality agreement is in place. 2 32 Nev224. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 4, at 585 ("What complicates the analogy between
industrial and political democracy-what disrupts the symmetry between the
union election and the political election-is the economic authority of
employers.").
225. See Brudney, supra note 8, at 849 ("[Tlhe argument that an employer's formal
neutrality stance compromises employee free choice seems to rest, at bottom, on
the notion that § 8(a)(2) [of the Act] contemplates a fundamentally adversarial
relationship between management and labor.").
226. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 603 (1969).
227. The Illinois courts have observed that public employers in that state have a neutrality obligation, at least with respect to competing representation claims of two
or more unions. See Local 253 Div. Affiliated With Local 50, Serv. Employees
Int'l Union v. Ill. Labor Relations Bd., 512 N.E.2d 1008, 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
("The employer's duty at all times is to remain neutral.").
228. Petitioners' Joint Brief on the Merits, supra note 72, at 7.
229. Id. at 8.
230. Id. at 9.
231. Brief of the HR Policy Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 146, at 23.
232. See, e.g., Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 27, at 50 ("The rate of'other' violations or
tactics was substantially higher for neutrality than card check. Thus, there is
support for the hypothesis that neutrality language reduces the use of some, but
not all, management tactics."). An example of one of the "other" tactics used by
employers was "manager-organized card revocation or decertification campaigns." Id.
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ertheless, the presumption of additional weight to employer actions in
this context was gladly invoked. The petitioners also utilized the oftinvoked image of the card solicitor "stand[ing] over [the employees] as
they 'vote,"'233 a vivid evocation of intimidation that belies the pedestrian evidentiary purpose for witnessing the signing of a card and
countersigning it in turn. Indeed, this witnessing-and-countersigning
method was lauded as a valuable "safeguard" against fraud in the case
made to California's PERB by a management advocate in favor of its
revocation regulations.234
The motivations for such concern over the potential for misconduct
in the card-check process are cast in stark relief by the Board's concurrent rulings in two failure-to-bargain cases decided around the same
time as Dana Corp. Where the Board in Dana Corp. credited without
further inquiry the petitioners' concerns, it did not in these other two
cases discuss whether such concerns would also be properly considered in a decertification drive, which is as public as a card check and a
far cry from a secret ballot election. It also accepted without criticism
the premise that employer and union campaigning is necessary for
employees to reach an informed decision as to the pros and cons of
unionization. Such campaigning would be strictly forbidden as an Unfair Labor Practice charge in the context of the circulation of a decertification petition,235 yet the Board was comfortable presuming in
both of the withdrawal-of-recognition cases that the employees' decisions in that context would be fully informed. And there is no basis
given for the Board's apparent belief that a quickly-circulated employee decertification petition during the fourty-five-day window period created by Dana Corp. would not be as susceptible to group
pressures and uninformed decision-making as a card-check campaign
that assuredly went on for a longer period. 23 6
There is an irony to this turn of events. In a sense, the proponents
of card check are arguing that the rationale and holding of Gissel be
applied on a systemic level. Their claim is that the Board-run election
system has become so unfavorable to employees that cards should generally be permitted to evidence majority support. 237 But this push has
233. Petitioners' Joint Brief on the Merits, supra note 72, at 30.
234. Letter from Renne Sloan Holtzman Sakai LLP, supra note 117, at 2 (discussing
SB180, which "would require, among other safeguards ... that a witness be present when an employee signs a card and that the witness also then sign the
card.").
235. See, e.g., NLRB CASEHANDLING MANuAL § 11730.3(a) (finding of merit to charge
that employer was directly or indirectly involved in the initiation of a decertification petition may invalidate petition or some or all of the showing of interest).
236. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (hearsay exception for "statement relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition").
237. See Becker, supra note 4, at 583-84 ("Arguably, the direction of labor law reform
should lie in transforming the Gissel exception into the general rule ....
The nub
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come at a time when modern decision-makers no longer view these
issues in the way that the Warren Court, the Board of that era, and
their predecessors did. As a result, at every opportunity these judicial
and administrative decision-makers have credited the concerns of
union misconduct, despite the lack of evidence, 238 and created procedural solutions to these concerns that provide employers with additional opportunities to assert their own uniquely-available forms of
pressure and coercion. 23 9
VI.

THE NOVEL AND OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF
"EMPLOYER FREE CHOICE"

The emphasis on the degree of employer knowledge that should be
required to obligate that employer to engage in collective bargaining is
not an entirely new one for the Board. It has its origins in the foundational arguments surrounding passage of the Wagner Act. 24 0 It is also
the animating perspective of a line of Board jurisprudence that deals
with employers who withdraw from collective bargaining, in violation
of their obligation to bargain under § 8(a)(5) of the Act. This is because employers who recognize unions with the support of only a minority of employees violate § 8(a)(2) of the Act. 24 1 As a result,
employers who refuse to bargain will offer as their defense a desire to
avoid liability for recognizing a minority union. The plain language of
the Act imposes strict liability on employers who recognize minority
unions, 24 2 so the fundamental question in assessing the merits of this

238.

239.

240.

241.

242.

of the Gissel ruling was that precisely because labor representatives do not govern, it is proper, at least in exceptional circumstances, for them to be chosen by
nonelectoral means.").
But see Dillard & Dillard, supra note 176, at 35-41 (arguing that adherence to
philosophy of "electoral formalism" in NLRA context explains lack of factual support for coercion-related arguments of card-check opponents).
See, e.g., Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 27, at 57 ("While employers may continue
to argue that [card-check and neutrality] agreements hamper free choice by silencing one point of view, we found that they reduced the use of illegal tactics
such as discharges and promises of benefits, as well as the supervisory one-onone campaigns that are destructive of relationships and emotionally traumatizing.") (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 597 n.11(1969) ("The right of an employer lawfully to refuse to bargain if he had a good faith doubt as to the Union's
majority status, even if in fact the Union did represent a majority, was recognized
early in the administration of the Act.") (citation omitted).
The existence or lack thereof of § 8(a)(2) liability was discussed in the briefing
and decision in Dana Corp. See Dana 11, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007), 2007 WL
2891099 *5 ("[T]here is no 8(a)(2) challenge to the negotiations of the agreements
or to the agreements themselves. Nor is there an 8(a)(2) challenge to the grant of
recognition.").
See Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas
Corp.), 366 U.S. 731, 739 (1961) ("We find nothing in the statutory language prescribing scienter as an element of the unfair labor practices are involved. The act
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defense therefore becomes: "What degree of evidence is sufficient to
allow an employer to opt out of collective bargaining?"
Over the years, the federal courts and the Board have gone back
and forth on this issue. The Board has most recently held that an
employer could only refuse to bargain where it could "prove that an
incumbent union has, in fact, lost majority support."243 This decision
came in response to the Supreme Court's holding a few years prior
that an employer only needed to have a "good faith reasonable doubt"
as to the union's majority, 24 4 and it represented the Board's attempt
to reinsert a requirement that an employer have actual factual support for its belief that the union no longer represents a majority of
245
employees.
In a 2-1 decision issued on the same day as Dana Corp., the Board
indicated that such factual support could be of a form vastly inferior to
card-check authorizations such as the ones used in that case. In Wurtand Nursing & Rehabilitation Center,246 two of the same Board
members (including the Chairman) who had formed the majority in
Dana Corp. allowed an employer to withdraw from bargaining on the
basis of "an employee petition containing the signatures of more than
50 percent of the employees in the unit," which read: "We the em-

243.
244.

245.

246.

made unlawful by § 8(a)(2) is employer support of a minority union. Here that
support is an accomplished fact. More need not be shown, for, even if mistakenly,
the employees' rights have been invaded. It follows that prohibited conduct cannot be excused by a showing of good faith.") (emphasis in original).
Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 723 (2001).
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359, 365-66 (1998).
This case was decided in the context of whether an employer had interfered with
its employees' rights under § 8(a)(1) of the Act by polling them as to their degree
of support for the union. See Strucksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967);
Blue Flash Express, 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954). However, the polling cases and
withdrawal-from-bargaining cases have always been applied to each other insofar as they speak to the employer's basis for acting as a defense to Unfair Labor
Practice charge liability. See, e.g., Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., Inc., 333
N.L.R.B. at 723 ("Because polling raises concerns that are not presented here, we
shall leave to a later case whether the current good-faith doubt (uncertainty)
standard for polling should be changed.").
See, e.g., Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. at 725 ("[U]nless an
employer has proof that the union has actually lost majority support, there is
simply no reason for it to withdraw recognition unilaterally."). Proof is required
because, "from the earliest days of the Act, the Board has sought to foster industrial peace and stability in collective-bargaining relationships, as well as employee free choice, by presuming that an incumbent union retains its majority
status." Id. at 720 (citing, inter alia, NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494
U.S. 775, 794 (1990)). Much like the presumption of asymmetrical employer
power in the workplace, this presumption has been sharply criticized. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 522 U.S. at 378 (referring to the Board's irrebuttable presumption of majority support for the union for one year after
certification as a "counterfactual evidentiary presumption[ ]").
351 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (2007), 2007 WL 2963268.

20081

STACKING THE DECK

ployee's [sic] of Wurtland nursing and rehab wish for a vote to remove
the Union S.E.I.U. 1199."247 The majority overruled the administrative law judge's finding that "the word 'vote' necessarily implied a
choice," holding that "the more reasonable reading of the petition is
that the signatory employees wished 'to remove' the Union as their
representative."248
The previous month, the Board Chairman had joined in another 21 majority in the Shaw's Supermarkets249 decision, which allowed an
employer to withdraw from bargaining, after the expiration of the contract bar but during the term of a collective-bargaining agreement.
The basis of the employer's decision was an employee decertification
petition comprised of "slips signed by bargaining unit employees stating, 'I do not want UFCW Local 1445 to continue to represent me as
my collective bargaining agent with my employer, "Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc.""'25o Holding that "an uncoerced majority [of employees]
has now rejected continued representation," the Board declared that
"the goal of employee freedom of choice must be vindicated." 25 1 Declining to "await[ ] the outcome of the decertification election," an option the majority considered "problematic where a union has actually
lost majority support,"252 the Board instead held:
In light of the loss of majority, and the delays that can attend the processing of
a petition, we would permit the withdrawal of recognition, so that the employees will not be forced to
endure, for the rest of the agreement, representation
2 53
they no longer desire.

In neither case were there any discussions of the potential for (or
actual existence of) coercion, misrepresentation, or fraud in the acquisition of the petition and slips used in each case to gather employee
sentiment. Nor was the accuracy of those documents questioned. The
Board in Shaw's Supermarkets went out of its way to note that "the
bona fides of the Respondent's evidence of the Union's loss of majority
support [was] unchallenged,"254 despite the fact that the slips were
counted by an "accounting firm hired by the Respondent," 255 a process
that presumably was no more equivalent to the Board's election
processes than any given arbitrator's counting and verification of
card-check authorizations.
Most telling was the Board majority's reference to employees being
forced to "endure" representation they did not desire. The Shaw's Su247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
350 N.L.R.B. No. 55 (2007), 2007 WL 2322536.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *5-*6 .
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *2.
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permarkets majority made sure to recite the boilerplate sentiment
that "[c]ontinuing to recognize and deal with such a union is as deleterious to employee rights as failing to recognize a union that enjoys
majority support."256 Yet there was no comparable concern expressed
by these same Board members in the Dana Corp. majority that employees who had expressed a desire for representation would be forced
to endure the absence of any such representation during "the delays
that can attend the processing of a petition," 257 such as a decertification election petition filed during the forty-five-day period after voluntary recognition. Instead, the merits of the proof that such a majority
even existed were questioned, and unsupported concerns about the
process by which such proof was obtained were credited without further discussion.
What this makes clear is that the entity which is in fact being
forced to "endure" an unwanted situation, in both instances, is the employer-and this is where the Board's concerns lie. Such a concern
with employer free choice is consistent with the line of jurisprudence
in which Wurtland Nursing and Shaw's Supermarkets lie, and the
perspective of the Dana Corp. decision indicates the extent to which
this jurisprudence has been imported into the voluntary-recognition
context. The question of when an employer may opt out of collective
bargaining has mutated into the question of when an employer must
opt in to bargaining with its employees. In this way, the Board has
come to openly doubt the first principles of American labor relations.
VII.

CONCLUSION: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The concerns of PERB in California and the Appellate Court in Illinois illustrate that it is not just the federal labor board that has an
interest in revisiting these issues. The legislatures in these two states
quite literally agreed in writing on the degree to which they believe
public employers should opt in to collective bargaining. This did not
prevent a significant difference of opinion on the way the agreement is
to be implemented. This should give pause to proponents of the Employee Free Choice Act, who may believe that passage of that federal
legislation would provide an anodyne to these concerns. 258 The lesson
of Dana Corp., Illinois, and California is that card check may represent a "bridge too far" for the labor relations consensus in the
2 59
United States, which has at all times been a fragile one.
256. Id. at *6.
257. Id. at *7.
258. Cf Becker, supra note 4, at 584-85 (arguing that "abandoning the union election
is not merely politically infeasible. It would also cut against the principle of majority rule that is central to the union's effective representation of employees.").
259. See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, FederalRegulation of the Workplace in the Next
Half-Century, 61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 631, 639 (1985) ("The intensity of opposition
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There are solutions that proponents of card check could propose in
the hope that they may address these concerns. One proposal is to
enhance the NLRB's existing standards, for assessing whether fraud,
260
coercion, or intimidation is implicated in the collection of cards, to
set out specific procedures for determining whether such charges are
valid. The Board's standards could also be modified to give parties a
right to demand such an inquiry where sufficient evidence is
presented and perhaps even an expedited hearing on the matter,
which are rights they do not currently enjoy. 26 1 As discussed in this
Article, PERB unsuccessfully attempted to modify its proof of support
standards to eliminate the prima facie threshold for consideration of
26 2
evidence submitted of fraud or coercion in the card-check process,
which may serve to indicate the prospects for that type of reform. Furthermore, both California and Illinois have more detailed, specified
standards for determining the validity of a proof of support showing
than the NLRB,263 but that did not prevent attempts in those states
to alter or overlay additional measures on top of those standards in
the name of combating the specter of union card fraud or coercion.
If the EFCA comes before Congress again, greater proof of support
procedures could be mandated by the legislation, which may ease its
passage. 2 64 There is no mechanism to enforce greater proof of support
standards on the arbitrators and other individuals who normally
check cards gathered under a private card-check agreement, 265 apart
from the moral pressure of greater statutory standards and perhaps
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to unionization which is exhibited by American employers has no parallel in the
western industrial world.").
See NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL §§ 11028.1, 11028.3, 11029, 11029.4.
Whether or not to engage in such an inquiry is presently within the discretion of
the Board. NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL § 11021.
Supra note 105.
See PERB Reg. § 32700 (2007) (proof of support standards for representation proceedings); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 315/9(a-5) (2007) (directing election where ILRB is
presented with "clear and convincing evidence that the dues deduction authorizations, and other evidence upon which the Board would otherwise rely to ascertain
the employees' choice of representative, are fraudulent or were obtained through
coercion").
For example, New Hampshire, which passed a card-check law for its public employees in 2007, promulgated required minimum language for authorization
cards, and specified the procedures for assessing the proof of support showing.
See N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. PELRB 301.05 (2008), available at http://www.nh.
gov/pelrb/arules.htm#PART%20Pub%20301%20BARGAINING%20UNIT%20
CERTIFICATION (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). California's attempt to do something similar was defeated alongside the other modifications discussed in more
detail in this article. See discussion supra at Section III(B).
A similar problem applies to mediators from California's State Mediation and
Conciliation Service (the "SMCS"), who check card authorizations under the
MMBA. The SMCS mediators have no enforcement power and can only seek to
have the parties consent to acceptable standards, although the mediators will
look to PERB's proof of support regulation in defining the boundaries of what
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lobbying of the American Arbitration Association for the promulgation
of guidance by that entity. However, even under existing law, the
Board has no obligation to enforce card-check recognition where it has
been presented with credible evidence of invalid cards in sufficient
numbers to defeat the proof of support showing.266 Proponents of card
check may be forgiven for failing to recall that there are already safeguards in existence, even for wholly private card-check organizing
campaigns.
The acceptance of further proof standards for authorization cards,
or the creation of additional procedural or evidentiary steps in the process, may be a necessary trade-off between opponents and proponents
of card check for the continued sanction of this organizing method.
That should not belie the lack of alternatives available to proponents
of card check in making such trade-offs. Labor presently lacks the
density in the American workforce that would allow it to clearly
demonstrate the benefits of encouraging collective bargaining in this
country, and it views card check as its best hope for ultimately achieving that density. However, the absence of the principle of asymmetrical employer power in the card-check debate-except where it aids, to
whatever limited extent, the antiunion argument-illustrates the degree to which the American labor movement and its supporters must
broadly re-argue that such benefits even exist, before they can move to
the next step of proving that case. A union cannot, after all, argue its
record of representation to a workforce if it has no such record of
which to speak.

may be feasible. Interview with Paul Roose, State Mediation & Conciliation
Serv. (Feb. 15, 2008).
266. See, e.g., NLRB v. Regency Grand Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 2008 WL 449782, at *3
(3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2008) ("The Board has held that it is 'not bound by a neutral
party's authorization card count where it was shown that particular cards which
were counted toward a union's majority status were, in fact, invalid.'") (citing
Sprain Brook Manor, 219 N.L.R.B. 809 (1975)).

